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INTRODUCTION 
[L]aws are not abstract propositions. They are expressions of policy 
arising out of specific situations and addressed to the attainment of 
particular ends. The difficulty is that the legislative ideas which 
laws embody are both explicit and immanent. And so the bottom 
problem is: What is below the surface of the words and yet fairly a 
part of them?1 
Our legal community is not alone in debating the use of legislative 
history as a resource for the interpretation of statutes. In 1992, the House 
of Lords in Pepper v. Hart2 overruled more than two centuries of 
precedent when it decided that courts could refer to and rely on Hansard—
the official record of standing committee proceedings and parliamentary 
debates3—to aid in construing enacted laws. The ensuing period has 
witnessed intense disagreements over the scope and propriety of Pepper. 
As is true in the United States, the British debate has occurred among legal 
scholars4 as well as judges, and the judicial exchanges have taken place 
both in academic settings5 and through pronouncements from the bench.6 
 
 
 1. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533 
(1947). 
 2. Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42 (H.L. 1992) (U.K.). 
 3. The official verbatim report of U.K. parliamentary proceedings takes its name from the 
Hansard family. Luke Hansard was the printer of the Journals of the House of Commons from 1774 to 
1828; his sons and grandsons succeeded him in the business. The government took over the reporting 
function in 1908; the name Hansard was restored to the title page in 1943. See DAVID M. WALKER, 
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 553 (1980). 
 4. Compare J. H. Baker, Case and Comment: Statutory Interpretation and Parliamentary 
Intention, 52 C.L.J. 353 (1993) (criticizing Pepper), and Scott C. Styles, The Rule of Parliament: 
Statutory Interpretation After Pepper v. Hart, 14 O.J.L.S. 151 (1994) (same), with Stefan Vogenauer, A 
Retreat from Pepper v. Hart?: A Reply to Lord Steyn, 25 O.J.L.S. 629 (2005) (defending the decision). 
 5. Compare Lord Johan Steyn, Pepper v. Hart: A Re-examination, 21 O.J.L.S. 59 (2001) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/1
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The judicial arm of the House of Lords—known as the Law Lords7—
has opened the door to the use of legislative history at a time when the 
United States Supreme Court has been clamping down on such usage.8 
Accordingly, one might wonder if the British and American judicial 
systems are in the process of trading places on this interpretive issue. In 
fact, citation to Hansard by the Law Lords in the past decade does not 
approach the levels of reliance on legislative history practiced by the 
Supreme Court. Notwithstanding the appreciable influence of Justice 
Scalia, Supreme Court Justices continue to make use of legislative history 
in their opinions between three and five times more often than their 
counterparts in Britain.9  
On the other hand, despite a spirited reaction to Pepper by several 
members of the Law Lords,10 references to Hansard have been increasing 
in the years since 2000. Moreover, the great majority of judges serving on 
 
 
(criticizing Pepper), and Lord Millett, Construing Statutes, 20 STATUTE L. REV. 107 (1999) (same), 
with Lord Hoffmann, The Intolerable Wrestle with Words and Meanings, 114 S. AFR. L.J. 656, 669 
(1997) (justifying the decision in part). 
 6. Compare, e.g., Jackson v. Att’y Gen. [2005] UKHL 56, [2005] 4 All E.R. 1253, 1285 (U.K.) 
(Steyn, L.J.) (criticizing and declining to rely on Pepper), and Robinson v. Sec’y of State [2002] 
UKHL 32, [2002] N. Ir. L.R. 390, 400, 404–05, 413, 420 (U.K.) (Bingham, Hoffmann, Hobhouse & 
Millett, L.JJ.) (same), with Harding v. Wealands [2006] UKHL 32, [2006] 4 All E.R. 1, 12–13, 23, 25–
26 (U.K.) (Hoffmann, Rodger & Carswell, L.JJ.) (defending and relying on Pepper), and Jackson, 
[2005] 4 All E.R. at 1276–77 (Nicholls, L.J.) (same), and Mirvahedy v. Henley [2003] UKHL 16, 
[2003] 2 All E.R. 401, 438 (U.K.) (Walker, L.J.) (invoking and placing some reliance on Pepper). 
 7. The House of Lords as a court consists of twelve Lords of Appeal in Ordinary and, until very 
recently, the Lord Chancellor. See Administration of Justice Act, 1968, c.5 § (1)(1)(a) (U.K.), 
amended by Maximum Number of Judges Order 1994 S.I. 1994⏐3217 ¶ 2 (U.K.). See generally 
GLENN DYMOND, THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, H.L. Library Note No. 
2006/002, at 10–14 (2006), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/HLLAppellate.pdf. The 
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary—usually referred to as the Law Lords—are appointed by the Queen upon 
recommendation from the Prime Minister; such recommendation, in turn, was until 2005 based on 
advice from the Lord Chancellor. The Law Lords, who are made life peers, review appeals in panels 
that typically consist of five members but may be as few as three; in relatively rare cases, there may be 
as many as seven or even nine members if the issues presented are viewed as especially difficult or 
important. See TERENCE INGMAN, THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROCESS 4–8 (11th ed. 2006); MICHAEL 
ZANDER, THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS 339–42 (William Twining & Christopher McCrudden eds., 6th 
ed. 2004). Under the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, the Lord Chancellor continues to play an 
administrative role in the justice system, but he no longer serves as a judge, and his responsibility for 
judicial appointments has been shifted to a new Judicial Appointments Commission. See OONAGH 
GAY, PARLIAMENT AND CONSTITUTION CENTER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ACT 2005—THE 
ROLE OF THE LORD CHANCELLOR, H.C. Library Standard Note PC/3792, at 3–5 (2005), 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snpc-03792.pdf. 
 8. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? 
Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 222–24 
(2006); Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The 
Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 384–87 (1999). 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. See infra Part I.C. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Britain’s highest court over the past decade have invoked legislative 
history materials in their opinions, many on a repeated basis.11 Thus, even 
if the Law Lords are unlikely to value legislative history to the same extent 
as does the Supreme Court, a new era of reliance on that history has been 
launched, and the debate among British judges is instructive from a 
comparative standpoint. 
This Article offers the first empirical examination of how often, and in 
what ways, Britain’s highest court has used previously excluded 
legislative history materials in its judicial decisions. It also represents the 
first effort to compare legislative history treatment between the Law Lords 
and the Supreme Court. The Article’s comparative inquiry identifies 
differences in the frequency with which legislative history is invoked in 
each Court’s decisions and offers explanations for the distinct patterns of 
usage that have emerged. 
Several key differences in national lawmaking structures and processes 
help account for why legislative history usage remains substantially 
greater in the Supreme Court than in the Law Lords.12 For a start, the 
committee report—a primary source of reliable legislative history in the 
American context—is essentially absent from the British setting, where 
parliamentary standing committees play only a peripheral role in creating 
and explaining bill language. Further, negotiation and compromise 
following bill introduction are normal features of Congress’s decentralized 
and discontinuous decision making but are exceptional occurrences under 
the more efficient methods by which bills are enacted in Parliament. 
Because legislative history in the United States typically addresses the 
meaning of text that has been modified if not recast during the lawmaking 
process, the Supreme Court often refers to that history to help understand 
legislative bargains. Conversely, because legislative compromise is rarely 
required under Britain’s party-controlled parliamentary regime, there is 
less need to refer to Hansard to explain text that remains substantially 
unaltered since its introduction. Finally, parliamentary materials approved 
for citation under the rule of Pepper consist almost exclusively of 
statements by government ministers.13 By contrast, our legislative history 
includes a richer and more diverse set of materials, generated at different 
 
 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. See infra Part II.C. 
 13. See Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, 64, 69 (H.L. 1992) (U.K.) (Browne-Wilkinson, 
L.J.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/1
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stages by Congress and its committees, with executive branch 
representatives cast in supporting roles at Congress’s invitation.14 
Still, even though there are institutional reasons to anticipate less 
frequent use of legislative history by the Law Lords than by the Supreme 
Court, the British innovation of invoking Hansard as an interpretive aid is 
alive and well after fifteen years. The Law Lords have recently indicated 
that parliamentary materials may be used under conditions broader than 
those set forth in Pepper, and Hansard is admissible based on much the 
same intentionalist and purposive justifications as the Supreme Court has 
applied when valuing legislative history in statutory construction. 
Although it remains early in the Law Lords’ venture with this new 
interpretive asset, the Article predicts that reliance on Hansard will 
continue and may even increase in the future. The Article then uses 
comparative analysis to offer preliminary thoughts as to how each 
country’s highest court might learn from the other’s approach to 
legislative history usage. 
Since Pepper, the Law Lords have framed their disagreements over 
legislative history in less polarized terms than have been applied in the 
United States. British judges have tended to argue over when and to what 
extent Hansard is probative in assisting courts to interpret Parliament’s 
laws, whereas the current contest on the Supreme Court has been about 
whether legislative history should be admissible in court at all.15 Our 
judicial conversations could profit from Britain’s more textured approach. 
At the same time, legislative history applications adopted by the Law 
Lords have involved a shifting series of aspirationally objective rules. The 
search for bright-line answers may reflect an understandable judicial 
impulse to direct and confine the use of this new and potentially open-
ended interpretive resource. Yet the Supreme Court’s relatively ad hoc 
method of applying legislative history, although messier in conceptual 
 
 
 14. Recent controversy over the proliferation of signing statements by President Bush reflects the 
novelty of unilateral forays into bill interpretation by the executive branch—forays that would be far 
less controversial in a system dominated by executive branch commentary. See AM. BAR ASS’N, TASK 
FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE, 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 20, 26 (2006), http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements (click 
on “Task Force Report with Recommendations”) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT] (urging that 
Presidents cease using signing statements to state an intention to interpret or enforce a law in a manner 
inconsistent with the will of Congress, and observing that most courts give little or no weight to 
signing statements as “legislative history”); Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. 
Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1969 
[hereinafter S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing] (statements by Sen. Specter (Chair) and Sen. Leahy (ranking 
member)) (critical of President Bush’s unprecedented use of signing statements). 
 15. See generally John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Legislative Process, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 33 (2006). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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terms, arguably does a better job of promoting flexibility in the 
interpretive enterprise. Such flexibility should become more valued by 
Britain’s judiciary as it gains experience in reviewing and assessing 
parliamentary materials.  
Part I of the Article presents recent developments in Britain, including 
the basic rule of Pepper v. Hart and some key modifications or 
refinements of the rule announced in subsequent decisions. Part II begins 
with a quantitative comparison between the Law Lords’ invocation of 
Hansard since 1996 and the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history 
during the same time period. Part II then considers whether there are 
sound reasons for British courts to rely less on legislative history than do 
American courts. The comparison focuses on the nature of the legislative 
process in the two countries and on separation of powers issues, including 
the risks of opportunistic behavior by creators of legislative history. Part 
III examines certain elements of the current debate among British judges, 
using these elements to anticipate future uses of Hansard by the Law 
Lords. Part III also identifies differences between the British and 
American approaches that may be instructive for the Supreme Court in one 
respect and for the Law Lords in another. 
I. CHANGES WROUGHT BY PEPPER V. HART 
In the United States, federal courts began relying on legislative history 
to construe statutes in the latter part of the nineteenth century.16 The 
Supreme Court’s robust appetite for this interpretive resource dates 
primarily from the period after 1940, but judicial reliance increased 
gradually during much of the twentieth century.17 The absence of a single 
moment of self-conscious change by American courts contrasts notably 
with British experience. Pepper v. Hart was a watershed decision in 
constitutional as well as practical terms, and the Law Lords have revisited 
the ruling and its effects in remarkably frank terms. After fifteen years of 
soul-searching and some second thoughts, Britain’s highest court seems 
unlikely to backtrack on its commitment to the utility of legislative history 
as an interpretive resource. 
 
 
 16. For a major decision inaugurating modern practice, see Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. 
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 464–65 (1892). For isolated earlier examples, see Blake v. Nat’l Banks, 
90 U.S. 307, 319–20 (1874), and Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 459–60 (1878). 
 17. See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543–49 (1940); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 392 (1990); Frankfurter, supra 
note 1, at 543. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/1
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A. The Law Before Pepper 
As far back as 1769, British courts refused to consider parliamentary 
proceedings as an aid to statutory construction.18 By the mid-nineteenth 
century, courts had extended the exclusionary rule to bar examination of 
pre-legislative preparatory materials, such as reports authored by 
government-appointed commissioners that often formed the basis for the 
statute under review.19 The courts relaxed this harsher approach around 
1900, allowing judges to refer in their opinions to commission reports and 
White Papers20 for the purpose of determining the “mischief” a statute was 
intended to address, although not for the purpose of construing the words 
chosen by Parliament to address that mischief.21 Still, as late as 1980, it 
was technically prohibited for parties to cite in court anything said in the 
House of Commons without first obtaining consent from the House.22 
The justifications offered for excluding all references to parliamentary 
proceedings have been both constitutional and pragmatic. From a 
constitutional standpoint, Article 9 of the English Bill of Rights safeguards 
the freedom of parliamentary debates and proceedings against 
impeachment or questioning in the courts or any locations other than 
Parliament.23 Some judges and scholars concluded that this provision does 
more than simply protect the freedom of parliamentary debate; it also 
immunizes the debates and proceedings as a whole. They maintained that 
to review or analyze in court what is said by a bill sponsor or government 
minister in committee or on the floor of Parliament is to violate Article 
 
 
 18. Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 217 (K.B.) (Willes, J.); see Pepper, [1993] 1 All 
E.R. at 60–61 (Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.). 
 19. Salkeld v. Johnson, (1848) 154 Eng. Rep. 487, 495 (Exch. Div.); see also Pepper, [1993] 1 
All E.R. at 61 (Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.). 
 20. White Papers (printed on white paper) announce reasonably firm government policy on a 
particular issue and precede the introduction of a bill. In the words of former Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson: “A White Paper is essentially a statement of [g]overnment policy, in such terms that a 
withdrawal or major amendment, following consultations or public debate, tends to be regarded as a 
humiliating withdrawal.” HAROLD WILSON, THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT 1964–70: A PERSONAL 
RECORD 380 (1971). By contrast, Green Papers announce more tentative government proposals, ready 
for public discussion but with the government remaining uncommitted. Id. See generally GARY 
SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 59–60 (8th ed. 2006).  
 21. Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and 
Trademarks, [1898] A.C. 571, 575–76 (H.L. 1898) (U.K.) (Earl of Halsbury, L.C.); see also Pepper, 
[1993] 1 All E.R. at 61 (Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.). 
 22. David Miers, Citing Hansard as an Aid to Interpretation, 4 STATUTE L. REV. 98, 99 (1983); 
see also ZANDER, supra note 7, at 161. 
 23. 1 W. & M., c.36 § I(9) (1689). Article 9 states Parliament’s resolution “[t]hat the freedom of 
speech, and debates or proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any 
court or place out of parliament.” Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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9.24 A second constitutional justification, based on separation of powers, 
was that allowing floor statements by individual legislators to shed light 
on the intent or effect of a law would confuse the distinct roles of 
Parliament as sovereign in the making of laws and courts as sovereign in 
their interpretation.25 
The earliest judicial explanation for refusing to admit parliamentary 
materials, however, was practical rather than constitutional: House of 
Commons debates were not fully or accurately reported.26 Even after 
1909, when Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates offered an authoritative and 
comprehensive report of proceedings,27 the time and expense involved in 
reading all potentially relevant debates, and the special burden such an 
endeavor would impose on parties with lesser resources, were still 
regarded as serious obstacles.28 In 1969, when the Law Commissions of 
England and Scotland presented their comprehensive report on statutory 
interpretation, the commissioners recognized that Hansard was sufficiently 
relevant to the interpretative task of courts to warrant consideration.29 
Nonetheless, the commissioners recommended that the exclusionary rule 
be retained largely for practical reasons. They pointed to the difficulty of 
isolating the truly valuable information found in parliamentary debates and 
the consequent challenge of providing such information in a convenient 
and accessible form.30 
Like many major breaks with legal precedent or tradition, the decision 
in Pepper v. Hart did not simply materialize out of thin air. After the Law 
Commissions’ extended and thoughtful treatment, some appellate judges 
in the 1970s began voicing doubts as to the ongoing basis for a rigid rule 
of non-admissibility. A judge in one case advocated reliance on Hansard 
 
 
 24. See Francis Bennion, Hansard—Help or Hindrance? A Draftman’s View of Pepper v. Hart, 
14 STATUTE L. REV. 149, 152 & n.14 (1993) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES 163 
(17th ed. 1830)). Hansard’s Official Report includes the edited verbatim proceedings from both houses 
and their standing committees. See UK Parliament, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pahansard.htm 
(last visited May 15, 2007). 
 25. See Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, 63–64 (H.L. 1992) (U.K.) (Browne-Wilkinson, 
L.J.) (reciting argument for exclusion propounded by the government). 
 26. See Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 217 (Willes, J.) (K.B.) (giving as reason for 
refusing to consider parliamentary proceedings “[t]hat history [of changes a bill underwent in the 
house where it was first debated and approved] is not known to the other house, or to the Sovereign”). 
 27. See Vogenauer, supra note 4, at 631; H.C. Info. Office, Fact Sheet G17: The Official Report, 
2003, at 2–3, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/g17.pdf. 
 28. See Beswick v. Beswick, [1968] A.C. 58, 74 (H.L. 1967) (U.K.) (Lord Reid); Bennion, supra 
note 24, at 154. 
 29. THE LAW COMM’N (NO. 21) AND THE SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N (NO. 11), THE 
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES, 1969, 31–32. 
 30. Id. at 36. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/1
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for the purpose of identifying the mischief at which a law was aimed.31 
Lord Denning, in the Court of Appeal, went further, citing Hansard to help 
interpret and apply the statutory words under review.32 In the course of his 
opinion, Lord Denning lamented that too often judges “grope about in the 
dark for the meaning of an Act” because they are denied access to what is 
said in Parliament.33 He added that “[a]lthough it may shock the purists,” 
there was nothing to stop judges from consulting the debates on their own 
and gleaning guidance from them—something he himself “confess[ed]” to 
having done on numerous occasions.34 Upon further appeal, the House of 
Lords disagreed with Lord Denning’s position and re-affirmed the 
exclusionary rule,35 but the debate was becoming more open. 
In the years immediately preceding Pepper, the Law Lords recognized 
certain limited exceptions to the exclusionary rule. One exception allowed 
for consideration of a government minister’s policy statement to 
Parliament explaining how the government proposed to implement its 
broad statutory authority in a specific setting.36 The policy statement was 
deemed relevant in determining whether the minister had unlawfully 
exceeded his powers under the act in question.37 Another exception 
involved interpretation of delegated or secondary legislation—known as 
statutory instruments—designed to carry out requirements under European 
Community law.38 The Law Lords relied on the Hansard account of 
government explanations and member criticisms as an aid to determining 
Parliament’s intent in approving the regulations,39 although in doing so 
they observed that such delegated legislation was not subject to the same 
parliamentary processes of consideration and amendment that a bill would 
face.40 
These fairly modest inroads were followed, in November 1992, by the 
sea change of Pepper v. Hart, holding that reference to Hansard would 
 
 
 31. Race Relations Bd. v. Dockers’ Labour Club & Inst., Ltd., [1976] A.C. 285, 299 (H.L. 1974) 
(U.K.) (Simon, L.J.). 
 32. Davis v. Johnson, [1979] A.C. 264, 276–77 (C.A. 1977) (U.K.) (Denning, L.). 
 33. Id. at 276. 
 34. Id. at 277. 
 35. Id. at 337 (1978) (Viscount Dilhorne), 349–50 (Scarman, L.); see also S.G.G. EDGAR, 
CRAIES ON STATUTE LAW 128–29 (7th ed. 1971) (summarizing traditional position of excluding 
debates in Parliament). 
 36. See Brind v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., [1991] 1 All E.R. 720 (H.L. 1991) (U.K.). 
The decision addressed the government’s policy directing broadcast media to ban television or radio 
appearances by persons representing certain proscribed terrorist organizations. 
 37. See id. at 723–24 (Bridge, L.J.), 729–30 (Ackner, L.J.). 
 38. See Pickstone v. Freemans, [1988] 2 All E.R. 803 (H.L. 1988) (U.K.). 
 39. See id. at 806–07 (Keith, L.J.), 814–15 (Templeman, L.J.). 
 40. See id. at 807 (Keith, L.J.), 814 (Templeman, L.J.). 
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henceforth be permitted as an aid to the interpretation of primary 
legislation. In reaching its six-to-one majority decision, the Law Lords 
disavowed contrary holdings and rationales from a number of earlier 
decisions.41 
B. The Rule of Pepper 
Pepper v. Hart involved a tax statute; the controversy arose over how 
to measure the taxable fringe benefit received by nine members of the 
teaching staff at an independent boys’ school.42 Pursuant to a 
concessionary fee scheme operated by the school, the teachers’ sons were 
educated at a charge of one-fifth the fees paid by members of the public. 
The school was not filled to capacity, and its marginal costs in educating 
these additional boys were very low—minimal amounts for food, laundry, 
school supplies, etc.43 The boys’ parents argued that they owed no taxes at 
all, because the value of the fringe benefit they received was less than the 
one-fifth fees they had paid. The Crown, on behalf of the Inspector of 
Taxes, maintained that the expense incurred by the school was simply the 
average cost of its providing for the education of all enrolled children; this 
average cost well exceeded the one-fifth fees paid by the nine members of 
the teaching staff, and thus taxes were owed on the difference.44 
The Finance Act of 1976 provides that the proper measure of a taxable 
benefit is the “cash equivalent of the benefit.”45 Another section of the Act 
defines that phrase as “an amount equal to the cost of the benefit,” but 
further textual references to “cost of the benefit” might plausibly be 
viewed as meaning either an employer’s marginal cost or its average 
cost.46 At the conclusion of oral argument, the Law Lords determined by a 
four-to-one margin that the text should be construed in favor of the 
 
 
 41. See Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, 60–69 (H.L. 1992) (U.K.) (abandoning the rule set 
forth in Beswick v. Beswick, [1968] A.C. 58 (H.L. 1967); Black-Clawson Int’l Ltd. v. Papierwerke 
Waldhof-Aschaffenberg AG, [1975] 1 All E.R. 810 (H.L. 1975); Davis v. Johnson, [1979] A.C. 317 
(H.L. 1978); and Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd., [1980] 2 All E.R. 696 (H.L. 1980)). 
 42. See id. at 42. 
 43. See id. at 54. 
 44. See id.  
 45. Finance Act, 1976, c. 40, § 61(1) (U.K.). 
 46. Section 63(1) defines “cash equivalent of any benefit chargeable to tax under section 61” as 
“an amount equal to the cost of the benefit,” id. § 63(1) (emphasis added), arguably suggesting that the 
referenced cost is the marginal cost to the employer of providing the benefit. Section 63(2) adds that 
“the cost of a benefit . . . includes a proper proportion of any expense relating partly to the benefit and 
partly to other matters,” id. § 63(2) (emphasis added), suggesting perhaps more strongly the average 
cost to the employer of educating each child under its supervision. 
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government.47 They reasoned that the “cost of the benefit”—in traditional 
accountancy terms and as a matter of ordinary meaning—was properly 
understood in this setting to signify the average cost of providing the same 
educational benefit to all boys in the school.48 
Before the decision issued, however, the Law Lords became aware that 
in the course of debate on the passage of the 1976 Act, the Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury had responded to questions in the House of 
Commons on virtually the precise circumstances presented in the pending 
appeal.49 The Law Lords then held a second hearing before an enlarged 
panel of seven judges, addressed to the question of whether it was 
appropriate for the Court to depart from the exclusionary rule, and if so 
whether Hansard provided any guidance in deciding the instant case.50 The 
Court answered yes on both counts. 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson authored the leading speech.51 His primary 
reason for modifying the exclusionary rule was that allowing the Court to 
evaluate Hansard materials would further the Court’s “duty . . . to give 
effect to the intention of Parliament.”52 Recognizing that ambiguities in 
enacted text were inevitable, Lord Browne-Wilkinson noted that in many 
if not most cases, the parliamentary materials would shed no light on the 
interpretive matter facing the Court. But in those few instances where 
statements made during debates would provide “a clear indication of what 
Parliament intended in using those words,” it would be wrong for courts to 
“blind themselves” to such evidence and risk adopting a construction that 
would thwart rather than enforce Parliament’s true design.53 
In addition to this argument, based in effect on strengthening 
parliamentary supremacy, Lord Browne-Wilkinson relied on more 
 
 
 47. See Pepper, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 42 (listing five Lords of Appeal in Ordinary who heard the 
initial 1991 appeal); id. at 51 (Griffiths, L.J.) (describing himself as “in a judicial minority of one at 
the end of the first hearing”); id. at 52 (Oliver, L.J.) (describing the majority’s determination to dismiss 
taxpayers’ appeal at the end of the first hearing).  
 48. See id. at 52 (Oliver, L.J.) (justifying his initial position); id. at 72–73 (Browne-Wilkinson, 
L.J.) (same). 
 49. See id. at 54–55 (Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.). 
 50. See id. at 55 (Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.); see also supra note 7 (discussing the use of larger 
panels for especially important issues). 
 51. Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s speech was endorsed in its entirety by Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord 
Bridge of Harwich, Lord Ackner, and Lord Oliver of Aylmerton. See Pepper, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 49, 
51–52. Lord Griffiths endorsed the result and the leading speech’s treatment of Hansard, see id. at 50, 
while the Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, dissented, see id. at 46–49. 
 52. See id. at 64. 
 53. See id. Relatedly, Lord Browne-Wilkinson also noted the importance of “the purposive 
approach to construction now [widely] adopted by the courts in order to give effect to the true 
intentions of the legislature.” Id. at 65. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1 Brudney book pages.doc11/13/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
12 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:1 
 
 
 
 
pragmatic considerations as well. One was the illogical nature of current 
legal distinctions regarding admissibility. The Law Lords had long 
permitted courts to examine White Papers and commission reports to help 
ascertain the mischief that a law aimed to correct; a ministerial statement 
made in Parliament was no less authoritative in this regard.54 Likewise, the 
Law Lords had invited courts to rely on ministerial statements made when 
introducing statutory instruments that could not be amended by 
Parliament; such statements were not sensibly distinguishable from 
ministers’ introductory statements explaining primary legislation, much of 
which is never amended prior to passage.55 A further pragmatic concern 
was that the exclusionary rule was impeding fairness and transparency in 
the litigation process. It prevented parties from addressing the courts on 
parliamentary materials even though many distinguished judges had 
admitted to peeking at Hansard and drawing their own inferences as to 
parliamentary intent.56 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson went on to consider and discuss the various 
practical and constitutional objections relied on by courts in the past to 
justify the exclusionary rule. He concluded that concerns over library 
access and lack of satisfactory indexing for Hansard were overstated. 
Similar concerns had been voiced with respect to the growing number of 
statutory instruments, but practitioners were coping with those materials 
even if at some expense.57 Lord Browne-Wilkinson also deemed 
exaggerated concerns that lawyers and judges lacked the sophistication to 
sift through and assess the weight of various parliamentary statements.58 
Although there would be research costs associated with combing through 
Hansard in hopes of finding clear evidence of parliamentary intent, these 
costs were easily over-estimated, especially given the limited nature of 
admissibility under the Court’s new standard.59 
The lead opinion also made relatively short work of the two principal 
constitutional arguments for excluding Hansard. With respect to the 
Article 9 contention, Lord Browne-Wilkinson reasoned that it stretched 
 
 
 54. See id. at 65. 
 55. Id. (drawing analogy to Pickstone v. Freemans, [1988] 2 All E.R. 803 (H.L. 1988), discussed 
supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text). 
 56. Id. at 66. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 67. For discussion of the Court’s standard, see infra notes 64–66 and accompanying 
text. Lord Griffiths, concurring in the result, emphasized that modern technology “greatly facilitates” 
the retrieval of Hansard materials, adding that based on personal experience, “it does not take long to 
recall and assemble the relevant passages in which the particular section was dealt with in Parliament, 
nor does it take long to see if anything relevant was said.” Id. at 50.  
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language and common sense too far to conclude that the use of Hansard 
for the purpose of construing a statute in court was a “questioning” of the 
proceedings in Parliament.60 Moreover, such a conclusion would then have 
to apply to all media reports reviewing or commenting on what is said in 
Parliament, an untenable result.61 With regard to the separation of powers 
argument, Lord Browne-Wilkinson observed that although statutory words 
are indeed the law, courts rely on a range of extrinsic sources—including 
White Papers and official government reports—as aids to construction of 
those words. The courts’ occasional reliance on parliamentary materials as 
a further interpretive aid raised no new constitutional question.62 It is 
noteworthy that the one Lord who disagreed with the Court’s decision had 
no constitutional concerns over the outcome; his reservations were 
directed only at cost-related practical arguments. Invoking the findings of 
the 1969 Law Commissions, the dissenting judge declined to eliminate the 
exclusionary rule absent a new comprehensive inquiry into the attendant 
litigation costs.63 
Having determined to depart from longstanding precedent, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson also set forth a three-part test aimed at limiting British 
courts’ newly conferred authority to consult and rely on Hansard. First, the 
statutory text in question had to be ambiguous or obscure, or its literal 
meaning had to lead to an absurdity.64 Even then, judicial reliance would 
not be proper unless the parliamentary record clearly identified either the 
targeted mischief or the legislative intention underlying the inconclusive 
text.65 Finally, parliamentary statements regarding the mischief or 
underlying intent could be deemed clear only if made by a government 
minister or other primary proponent of the bill, perhaps accompanied by 
questions or replies from members that provided proper context.66 
The lead opinion expressed confidence that its test would constrain 
counsel’s inclination to invoke Hansard, thereby limiting the costs to 
parties and courts of having to review and analyze parliamentary 
materials.67 To reinforce these limits, Lord Browne-Wilkinson added that 
attempts to introduce parliamentary material that failed to satisfy the three 
 
 
 60. Id. at 67. 
 61. Id. at 67–68. 
 62. Id. at 69. 
 63. Id. at 48 (Mackay of Clashfern, L.J.). For discussion of the Law Commissions’ report, see 
supra text accompanying notes 29–30. 
 64. Id. at 64 (Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. The three factors are restated later in the opinion. Id at 69. 
 67. Id. at 66–67. 
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factors should trigger an order for costs against the offending party.68 In 
addition, the lower courts issued a Practice Direction in 1994, specifying 
that five working days before a hearing, any party intending to refer to 
Hansard in court must provide the court and all other parties with copies of 
the Hansard extract and a summary of the planned argument based on that 
extract.69 This direction to counsel, which authorized sanctions for 
noncompliance, reinforced the judicial view that references to Hansard 
were not to be undertaken lightly. 
The Pepper majority applied its new test to the 1976 Finance Act and 
determined that the parliamentary material was admissible and highly 
probative. Reasoning that the “cost of the benefit” language in the Act was 
ambiguous as between an employer’s marginal or average cost,70 Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson proceeded to consider the Financial Secretary’s 
statements in Parliament. The statutory section at issue had sparked 
concern among members of Parliament because of its possible impact on 
concessionary travel benefits regularly bestowed on airline and railway 
employees. Existing government practice had been not to tax such benefits 
on an average cost basis. The Secretary had announced, at the start of a 
standing committee meeting in May 1976 (reported in Hansard), his 
withdrawal of a proposed subsection that would have taxed in-house 
benefits at the price paid by the public.71 After offering several policy 
reasons for this change, the Secretary also responded to various member 
inquiries by explaining that the marginal cost approach would continue to 
apply to such in-house benefits, and—in a government press release issued 
that day—he repeated his determination to leave the status quo unaltered.72 
The following month, at a further committee meeting on the bill, a 
member asked the Secretary whether the government’s earlier language 
modification would apply to concessionary fee arrangements for children 
 
 
 68. Id. at 67. In Melluish v. BMI Ltd., [1995] 4 All E.R. 453, 468 (H.L. 1995) (U.K.) (discussed 
infra notes 92–93 and accompanying text), Lord Browne-Wilkinson invoked the need for “appropriate 
orders as to costs wasted” in rejecting government counsel’s effort to rely on Hansard. It is difficult to 
know how often the sanction has been imposed by lower courts. 
 69. Practice Note, [1995] 1 All E.R. 234 (Supreme Court). This direction was reiterated in 1999 
and 2002. See Practice Direction, [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1027, 1059–60 (C.A. (Civ)); Practice Direction, 
[2002] 1 W.L.R. 2870, 2880, 2894 (C.A. (Crim)).  
 70. Pepper, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 69–70. 
 71. Id. at 57–58, 70. See supra note 24 (discussing Hansard’s inclusion of all standing committee 
proceedings). 
 72. Id. at 58–59. The policy reasons presented by the Secretary were (i) the injustice to taxpayers 
given the large difference between the actual cost of providing the additional services and the amount 
of benefit that would be taxed to the recipients; (ii) the resultant chill on employees’ use of such 
services, to the likely detriment of all parties; and (iii) difficulties of enforcement and administration. 
Id. at 58. 
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of staff at private schools. The Secretary responded affirmatively, stating 
the government’s change meant that “now the [educational] benefit will be 
assessed on the cost to the employer, which would be very small 
indeed.”73 There was no further relevant debate on the language prior to 
enactment.74 
To Lord Browne-Wilkinson, this legislative history was both clear and 
persuasive. Committee members had repeatedly pressed the government 
for guidance regarding the taxation of in-house benefits following the 
change in text, the minister’s statements were directly responsive and 
unambiguous, and the matter was not raised again after the extended 
committee discussion. Under these circumstances, the majority reasoned 
that it was proper “to attribute to Parliament as a whole the same intention 
as that repeatedly voiced by the Financial Secretary.”75 
The factual setting in Pepper, where the government argued in court 
for an interpretation it had expressly disavowed when promoting the bill in 
Parliament, might have led the Law Lords to adopt a narrower estoppel-
type justification for the admissibility of Hansard materials. Under this 
approach, courts would be allowed to consult Hansard only in cases where 
the government’s denial in court of a prior officially endorsed position 
amounted to fundamental unfairness. Counsel for the taxpayers at one 
point came close to embracing such a rationale,76 and some Law Lords 
have subsequently tried to limit Pepper’s scope based on this theory.77 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s opinion, however, does not rely on the injustice 
of the government’s reversing its position. His rationale for imputing 
collective intent is broader: irrespective of the equities involved, “[w]hat is 
persuasive . . . is a consistent series of answers given by the minister, after 
opportunities for taking advice from his officials, all of which point the 
same way and which were not withdrawn or varied prior to the enactment 
of the Bill.”78 
 
 
 73. Id. at 60. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 71. 
 76. Pepper, [1993] A.C. at 598 (reciting argument of appellant’s counsel at second hearing, 
referring to the Financial Secretary’s special expertise on complex tax measures and the public’s right 
to rely on his explicit and official representations as to a bill’s meaning when arranging their financial 
affairs). 
 77. See infra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
 78. Pepper, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 66. Lord Bridge, in his brief concurring opinion, did raise the 
estoppel issue, referring to the “acute question as to whether it could possibly be right to give effect to 
taxing legislation in such a way as to impose a tax which the Financial Secretary . . . had, in effect, 
assured the House of Commons it was not intended to impose.” Id. at 49. The importance of this 
alternative rationale is further addressed infra Part I.C. 
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C. Developments Since Pepper 
In the years following Pepper, the Law Lords have expressed a range 
of reactions in considering how and how often to make use of 
parliamentary materials. The responses by the Court as a whole may be 
divided into three periods. An initial fifteen-month interval of fairly 
frequent references to Hansard was followed by a more muted span of 
over five years, in which doubts surfaced as to the benefits of the Pepper 
approach. The third and current period involves more open disagreement 
among the Law Lords themselves. Although several Law Lords have 
expressed regrets about the door that Pepper opened, most appear to 
remain convinced of its wisdom, and the Court’s references to Hansard 
have increased in the years since 2000. 
1. Initial Enthusiasm 
Within the first fifteen months after Pepper came down, nine House of 
Lords decisions invoked parliamentary materials to help explain the 
meaning of legislative text.79 Given that the Law Lords decided between 
forty and fifty cases per year during this period,80 and that some cases did 
not involve matters of statutory construction, these nine instances qualify 
as a surge of interest in legislative history. Although a few decisions 
reflected only tangential use of Hansard,81 the judges often found the 
previously forbidden fruit helpful in resolving an interpretive 
controversy.82 For instance, Lord Griffiths in one decision invoked 
Hansard to establish that an earlier court had misapprehended Parliament’s 
true intent with respect to a statute of limitations provision.83 And Lord 
 
 
 79. The nine decisions were issued between November 1992 and February 1994. All cases 
invoking Hansard from 1992 to 2006 were identified by using the following search strategy on Lexis: 
“Hansard” or “HC debates” or “HL debates” or “Pepper” or “HC official report” or “HL official 
report.” 
 80. The House of Lords webpage includes a complete list of Law Lords decisions starting in 
November 1996. See House of Lords, Judicial Business, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/Id/ 
judgmt.htm (last visited May 15, 2007). A Lexis search indicates that the Law Lords issued forty-five 
decisions in 1993 and fifty-one in 1994. 
 81. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., [1994] 1 All E.R. 556, 566 (H.L. 1994) 
(U.K.); Scher v. Policyholders Prot. Bd., [1993] 4 All E.R. 840, 852 (H.L. 1993) (U.K.); Regina v. 
Preston, [1993] 4 All E.R. 638, 650 (H.L. 1993) (U.K.). 
 82. See, e.g., Holden & Co. v. Crown Prosecution Serv., [1994] 1 A.C. 22, 37 (H.L. 1993) 
(U.K.); Chief Adjudication Officer v. Foster, [1993] 1 All E.R. 705, 715–17 (H.L. 1993) (U.K.); 
Stubbings v. Webb, [1993] 1 All E.R. 322, 329 (H.L. 1992) (U.K.); Regina v. Warwickshire C.C. ex 
parte Johnson, [1993] A.C. 583, 588, 591–92 (H.L. 1992) (U.K.). 
 83. See Stubbings, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 329. 
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Bridge, faced with a language gap regarding appellate courts’ authority to 
order payment of attorneys’ costs, remarked that “[h]appily our new 
freedom to refer to Hansard solves the mystery.”84 
During this initial period, the Law Lords were less than rigorous in 
applying Pepper’s three-part test. On a number of occasions, the judges 
invoked parliamentary material as admissible and relevant without 
discussing at all the basis for concluding that the Pepper factors had been 
met.85 Further, the Court’s analysis often indicated that the Law Lords 
were referencing or relying on Hansard even though Pepper’s ambiguity 
factor had not been fulfilled. Thus, the judges invoked Hansard as support 
for what they independently understood to be the meaning of the text.86 
Such confirmatory references may be perfectly reasonable, but they are at 
odds with Pepper’s holding that a court could make no use of Hansard at 
all unless it found that the text was truly ambiguous or obscure.87 
2. The Bloom Fades 
From early 1994 through 1999, the Court’s usage of Hansard in 
statutory interpretation cases notably diminished. Over a period of close to 
six years, in which the Law Lords decided roughly fifty cases per year, the 
judges invoked parliamentary materials in their opinions in a mere thirteen 
decisions, barely more than twice each calendar year. Apart from the 
decline in citations to Hansard during this period, there are other 
indications that the Law Lords had become somewhat less enamored of 
this new interpretive resource. 
On a number of occasions, the Court simply ignored attorneys’ legal 
arguments based on parliamentary materials.88 Counsel may well have 
 
 
 84. See Holden, [1994] 1 A.C. at 37. 
 85. See, e.g., Stubbings, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 329, (Griffiths, L.J.); Warwickshire, [1993] A.C. at 
587–88, 591–92 (Roskill, L.J.); see also Associated Newspapers Ltd., [1994] 1 All E.R. at 566–67 
(Lowry, L.J.) (giving no reason for decision not to admit parliamentary materials under Pepper). 
 86. See Scher, [1993] 4 All E.R. at 852 (Mustill, L.J.); Stubbings, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 329 
(Griffiths, L.J.); Foster, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 717 (Bridge, L.J.); Warwickshire, [1993] A.C. at 592 
(Roskill, L.J.). See generally David Miers, Taxing Perks and Interpreting Statutes: Pepper v. Hart, 56 
MOD. L. REV. 695, 705–06 (1993). 
 87. The Law Lords also referenced Hansard statements from members other than ministers 
without discussing specifically how these legislators satisfied the third Pepper factor, discussed supra 
note 66 and accompanying text. See Stubbings, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 329 (Griffiths, L.J.); see also 
Regina v. Preddy, [1996] 3 All E.R. 481, 487–88 (H.L. 1996) (U.K.) (relying on statements from two 
members of the House of Lords later in the 1990s). 
 88. See, e.g., Regina v. Sec’y for the Home Dep’t ex parte Stafford, [1999] 2 A.C. 38, 41 (H.L. 
1998) (U.K.) (summarizing arguments of counsel); O’Rourke v. Camden London Borough Council, 
[1998] A.C. 188, 190 (H.L. 1997) (same); In re C, [1997] A.C. 489, 492 (H.L. 1996) (U.K.) (same); 
Deposit Prot. Bd. v. Dalia, [1994] 2 A.C. 367, 372–73 (H.L. 1994) (U.K.) (same). 
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been encouraged to invoke Hansard materials in their arguments by the 
Law Lords’ initial burst of enthusiasm, and the Court’s silence would not 
alone be sufficient to establish judicial misgivings. In some instances, 
however, the Law Lords were not merely silent but went further, voicing 
concern over what they regarded as excessive efforts to promote Hansard. 
For example, Lord Hobhouse in one opinion referred briefly to counsel’s 
unsuccessful attempt at reliance on Hansard, “purportedly under 
Pepper,”89 and in another, he criticized a lower court judge by name for 
taking account of parliamentary debates when Pepper gave “no warrant 
for such an approach.”90 
More frequently in this period, the Law Lords expressly considered 
arguments relying on Hansard but dismissed them because one or more of 
Pepper’s three factors had not been met. In particular, the Court several 
times determined that the legislative history cited was either itself unclear 
or not sufficiently definitive.91 In Melluish v. BMI, Ltd.—a tax case 
decided in 1995—Lord Browne-Wilkinson, the author of Pepper, 
complained about overreaching by counsel in their introduction of 
Hansard. He criticized the government for relying on parliamentary 
materials directed to a tax provision separate from the one under judicial 
review, adding that to seek guidance from a wholly distinct legislative 
proceeding was “an improper use of the relaxed rule introduced by 
Pepper.”92 Noting that such efforts to widen the permissible category of 
parliamentary materials offered no assistance to a court but risked 
considerable expense and delay, Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated that 
judges should make “appropriate orders as to costs wasted” in such 
settings.93  
Notwithstanding their concerns that counsel were at times pushing the 
“relaxed rule” of Pepper too far, the Law Lords continued to rely on 
Hansard materials to help resolve disputes over statutory meaning.94 
 
 
 89. Regina v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions ex parte Kebeline, [1999] 4 All E.R. 801, 851 (H.L. 
1999) (U.K.).  
 90. Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Ass’n Ltd., [1999] 4 All E.R. 705, 745 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.). 
 91. See Melluish v. BMI Ltd., [1995] 4 All E.R. 453, 468 (H.L. 1995) (U.K.) (Browne-
Wilkinson, L.J.); Sec’y of State for Soc. Sec. v. Remilien, [1998] 1 All E.R. 129, 146–47 (H.L. 1997) 
(U.K.) (Hoffmann, L.J.); Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 
[1998] 4 All E.R. 897, 931 (H.L. 1998) (U.K.) (Lloyd, L.J.). 
 92. Melluish, [1995] 4 All E.R. at 468. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Regina v. Oxfordshire C.C., ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council, [1999] 3 All E.R. 
385, 393 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.) (Hoffman, L.J.); Lowsley v. Forbes, [1998] 3 All E.R. 897, 905–06 (H.L. 
1998) (U.K.) (Lloyd, L.J.); Regina v. Preddy, [1996] 3 All E.R. 481, 487–88 (H.L. 1996) (U.K.) (Goff, 
L.J.).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/1
p 1 Brudney book pages.doc11/13/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] BELOW THE SURFACE 19 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, the Court occasionally sent mixed signals even when formally 
disavowing reliance on Hansard. In a 1997 decision, the leading speech 
observed that certain parliamentary materials were not admissible because 
the text itself was unambiguous, but it then proceeded to refer to those 
materials for informational background purposes.95 
Within the academic community, the Law Lords’ decision to admit 
parliamentary materials, which had been greeted with skepticism from the 
start,96 continued to generate negative reactions. Academic critics in the 
late 1990s reiterated that separation of powers principles should preclude 
judicial reliance on statements by members of the executive or legislative 
branches expounding on the law they were enacting.97 These critics also 
challenged the notion that statements by government ministers could 
reflect the intention of Parliament, insisting that collective intent was 
derivable only from the words of the text.98  
By the late 1990s, some Law Lords were publicly questioning the 
benefits of the new interpretive approach. In a 1997 lecture, Lord 
Hoffmann expressed sympathy in principle for judicial use of Hansard 
both because it could estop the executive from abandoning interpretive 
representations made before Parliament and because a high profile 
ministerial statement from which no member dissented was at times the 
best evidence of what Parliament must have understood it was 
approving.99 Yet Lord Hoffmann was doubtful whether the time and 
money spent on Hansard research was justified given how seldom it 
yielded truly probative results.100  
In a 1999 address, Lord Millett was more blunt, referring to Pepper as 
a “regrettable decision” in practical terms and also as a matter of 
 
 
 95. Inland Revenue Comm’rs v. Willoughby, [1997] 4 All E.R. 65, 69–71 (H.L. 1997) (U.K.) 
(Nolan, L.J.). 
 96. See Baker, supra note 4; Miers, supra note 86; Styles, supra note 4. 
 97. See, e.g., Geoffrey Marshall, Hansard and the Interpretation of Statutes, in THE LAW IN 
PARLIAMENT 139, 153–54 (Dawn Oliver & Gavin Drewry eds., 1998); Robert Summers, Interpreting 
Statutes in Great Britain and the United States—Should Courts Consider Materials of Legislative 
History?, in THE LAW, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GEOFFREY 
MARSHALL 222, 231–32 (David Butler et al. eds., 1999); see also DAVID ROBERTSON, JUDICIAL 
DISCRETION IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 183 (1998) (expressing concern that Pepper allows courts to rely 
on ministerial statements undermining civil liberties when the text being “explained” would not be 
viewed as accomplishing such a result). Academic criticism on constitutional grounds has not yet 
abated. See generally Aileen Kavanagh, Pepper v. Hart and Matters of Constitutional Principle, 121 
L.Q. REV. 98 (2005). 
 98. See Marshall, supra note 97, at 151–53; Summers, supra note 97, at 232–33, 235–36. 
 99. Lord Hoffmann, supra note 5, at 669. 
 100. Id. at 668; see also Lord Johan Steyn, Interpretation: Legal Texts and Their Landscape, in 
THE CLIFFORD CHANCE MILLENNIUM LECTURES: THE COMING TOGETHER OF THE COMMON LAW AND 
THE CIVIL LAW 79, 87–88 (Basil S. Markesinis ed., 2000). 
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constitutional principle.101 He discussed the impropriety of relying on 
unenacted intentions as well as the largely unproductive costs of Hansard-
related research.102 Lord Millett added, however, that although he objected 
to judicial references to the course of proceedings in Parliament, he 
endorsed “the practice of the American Congress of publishing detailed 
explanatory memoranda” that were not “made in the heat of debate.”103 
The “explanatory memoranda” presumably refers to congressional 
committee reports. 
Beginning in 2000, the concerns that had been voiced extrajudicially 
became part of an at times heated dialogue aired through the judicial 
opinions of the Law Lords. 
3. Full-Scale Debate 
An opening salvo from Lord Steyn, a member of the Law Lords since 
1994, focused the terms of the debate. In his Hart Lecture delivered at 
Oxford in May 2000, Lord Steyn assumed a lead critic’s stance 
comparable to Justice Scalia’s role in the Supreme Court. He 
acknowledged that he had initially supported the Pepper court’s majority 
opinion but declared that he had come to regard its current application as 
indefensible primarily on separation of powers grounds.104 
Lord Steyn did not propose to overrule Pepper, but instead to limit its 
scope. He believed that courts could cite to Hansard to identify the 
mischief at which a law was aimed, for the reasons Lord Browne-
Wilkinson gave in Pepper.105 He also believed that courts should rely on 
Hansard to prevent the executive from repudiating prior representations 
made to Parliament as to the meaning of statutory text, developing the 
estoppel argument suggested earlier by Lord Hoffmann.106 What he 
 
 
 101. Lord Millett, supra note 5, at 110. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Lord Steyn, supra note 5, at 62–68. Lord Steyn dismissed the Article 9 constitutional 
argument invoked by some academics, see supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text, as 
“transparently weak.” Lord Steyn, supra note 5, at 62. He repeated his previously expressed pragmatic 
concern that resort to Hansard was an “expensive luxury in our legal system” and also restated the by-
now familiar arguments against there being any discernible “intention” of Parliament outside of the 
text. Id. at 63–64. 
 105. See Lord Steyn, supra note 5, at 68, 70 (referring to analogy between Hansard and White 
Papers or commission reports in this regard). 
 106. See id. at 67, 70; cf. supra text accompanying note 99. This executive estoppel argument 
continues to receive support from some scholars. See, e.g., Francis Bennion, Executive Estoppel: 
Pepper v. Hart Revisited, PUB. L., Spring 2007, at 1, available at http://www.francisbennion.com/ 
2007/003.htm. 
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renounced, however, was the broader rationale for citing to Hansard; he 
maintained that it was “constitutionally unacceptable . . . to treat the 
intentions of the government as revealed in debates as reflecting the will of 
Parliament.”107 Lord Steyn has since presented his proposed limitations on 
Pepper in a number of judicial opinions. He has invoked parliamentary 
materials to help determine the mischief that a statute is intended to 
correct,108 but he maintains that ministerial statements in Hansard should 
be used only for this purpose or as an estoppel against the executive and 
not as evidence reflecting what Parliament meant by particular statutory 
words or phrases.109  
In the years since 2000, a number of Law Lords have expressed 
disappointment over what they view as the scant benefits and considerable 
costs associated with the use of Hansard. During this time period, the 
Court has been regularly attentive to Pepper’s three factors, often finding 
Hansard materials inadmissible either because ministerial statements were 
inconclusive110 or because the text itself was clear.111 Lord Hoffmann in 
2002 was more outspoken, declaring that based on ten years of experience 
under Pepper, the dissenting judge in that decision “ha[d] turned out to be 
the better prophet” in terms of predicting how rarely Hansard would be 
helpful compared to how heavily counsel would invest in mining the 
“large spoil heap of [parliamentary] material.”112 
 
 
 107. Lord Steyn, supra note 5, at 68. 
 108. See Lesotho Highlands Dev. Auth. v. Impreglio SpA [2005] UKHL 43, [2005] 3 All E.R. 
789, 798–99 (U.K.); Regina v. Soneji [2005] UKHL 49, [2005] 4 All E.R. 321, 324–25 (U.K.).  
 109. See Jackson v. Att’y Gen. [2005] UKHL 56, [2005] 4 All E.R. 1253, 1285 (U.K.) (Steyn, 
L.J., concurring); McDonnell v. Congregation of Christian Bros. Trs. [2003] UKHL 63, [2004] 1 All 
E.R. 641, 655–56 (U.K.) (Steyn, L.J., concurring). Although Lord Steyn originally tendered the 
estoppel argument as a preferred modification to the Pepper rule, Lord Hope has adopted the same 
argument as embodying the proper understanding of Pepper. See Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd., 
[2003] UKHL 40, [2003] 4 All E.R. 97, 130–31 (U.K.) (Hope, L.J., concurring); Regina v. Sec’y of 
State for the Env’t, Transp. and the Regions ex parte Spath Holme Ltd., [2001] 1 All E.R. 195, 226–27 
(H.L. 2000) (U.K.) (Hope, L.J., concurring). This seems manifestly incorrect as a reading of the 
majority opinion in Pepper, see supra text accompanying notes 76–78, although the Court has not 
explicitly rejected Lord Hope’s position in subsequent decisions.  
 110. See, e.g., Quintavalle v. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Auth. [2005] UKHL 28, [2005] 
2 All E.R. 555, 564 (U.K.) (Hoffmann, L.J.); Robinson v. Sec’y of State, [2002] N. Ir. L.R. 390, 400 
(U.K.) (Bingham, L.J.), 404 (Hoffmann, L.J.); Ex parte Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All E.R. at 211–12 
(Bingham, L.J.), 219 (Nicholls, L.J.). 
 111. See, e.g., Aston Cantlow Parochial Church Council v. Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2003] 3 
All E.R. 1213, 1225 (U.K.) (Hope, L.J.); Ex parte Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All E.R. at 212 (Bingham, 
L.J.). 
 112. Robinson, [2002] N. Ir. L.R. at 405; see also P. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Schoolmasters/Union of 
Women Teachers [2003] UKHL 8, [2003] 1 All E.R. 993, 1004 (U.K.) (Hoffmann, L.J.) (referring to 
“the usual hopeless attempt to obtain guidance from Parliamentary debates under the rule in Pepper”). 
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Apart from giving vent to practical frustrations, the Law Lords have 
identified some additional limits on the scope of Pepper. In Regina v. 
Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Spath Holme Ltd.,113 
decided in December 2000, the issue was whether the Secretary could 
exercise his statutory power to restrict rent increases solely for the purpose 
of controlling inflation; if so, then his restricting rents for a different 
reason (to mitigate hardship for a class of tenants in this particular case) 
was ultra vires.114 The Court of Appeal had consulted Hansard to help 
determine that the rent-restricting powers had been enacted as part of 
government counterinflationary policy, and therefore the Secretary’s use 
of them for another reason was unlawful.115 The Law Lords reversed, 
construing the relevant text to mean that there were no inflation-related 
limitations on the Secretary’s authority to impose a rent ceiling.116 
More important for Hansard purposes, the lead opinion went on to 
distinguish Pepper, which had turned on the meaning of a particular 
statutory phrase, from the instant case, which involved the scope of the 
government’s discretionary powers conferred by statute. Lord Bingham, 
who delivered the leading speech, reasoned that because such powers are 
inevitably open-ended, a minister’s contribution in Parliament is very 
unlikely to resolve doubts about all or even most future uses of these 
powers.117 He concluded—echoing to some extent Lord Steyn’s estoppel 
rationale—that unless a ministerial statement or response gave “a 
categorical assurance to Parliament that a power would not be used in a 
given situation, such that Parliament could be taken to have legislated on 
that basis,” ministerial statements addressed to the scope of a discretionary 
power were inadmissible.118 
The Law Lords announced a further restraint on judicial use of Hansard 
in Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd.,119 issued in July 2003. That case 
involved whether a 1974 consumer credit statute was compatible with the 
 
 
 113. Ex parte Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All E.R. 195. 
 114. Id. at 198. 
 115. Regina v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t, Transp. & the Regions [2000] 1 All E.R. 884, 899–
900 (C.A. 2000) (U.K.), rev’d, [2001] 1 All E.R. 195 (H.L. 2000). 
 116. See Ex parte Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All E.R. at 219 (Nicholls, L.J.), 211–12 (Bingham, L.J.), 
226–27 (Hope, L.J.), 219–23 (Cooke, L.J.), 233 (Hutton, L.J.). 
 117. See id. at 211–12 (Bingham, L.J.). 
 118. See id. at 212; see also id. at 227 (Hope, L.J.) (contending that Pepper should be understood 
to admit Hansard materials only on an estoppel rationale, and endorsing Lord Bingham’s use of that 
rationale here). But see id. at 218–19 (Nicholls, L.J.), 219–23 (Cooke, L.J.) (contending that 
ministerial statements addressed to scope of a discretionary power are admissible with varying degrees 
of persuasive weight).  
 119. [2003] UKHL 40, [2003] 4 All E.R. 97 (U.K.). 
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European Convention of Human Rights, which had been integrated into 
British law pursuant to the 1998 Human Rights Act.120 As part of its 
review, the Court considered whether Hansard materials could be 
consulted in order to help determine compatibility. 
Lord Nicholls, authoring the leading speech, concluded that courts 
were allowed to invoke parliamentary materials in this setting but only to a 
limited extent. He noted that evaluating the effect of domestic legislation 
to ascertain whether British law was incompatible with European 
Convention rights is a different enterprise from directly interpreting and 
applying such legislation.121 If the domestic law infringes on a convention 
right, a court must determine whether the law’s policy objective 
presumptively justifies such an infringement given the nature of the 
convention right and also whether the means the domestic law employs to 
achieve its policy objective are proportionate in terms of the adverse 
effect.122 Lord Nicholls concluded that when identifying a law’s policy 
objective or assessing its proportionality, a court is permitted to consult 
Hansard to seek “enlightenment on the nature and extent of the social 
problem (the ‘mischief’) at which the legislation is aimed,” but not to 
explore statutory meaning in further respects.123 
Lord Nicholls likened this approved use of Hansard “as a source of 
background information” to other “innocuous” uses previously 
countenanced under Pepper. He referred specifically to the use of 
ministerial statements that help identify the background when construing 
domestic statutes or that assist a court in understanding government policy 
when reviewing contested agency decisions.124 But Lord Nicholls added 
that beyond such reliance for background information purposes, Hansard 
 
 
 120. See id. at 109 (Nicholls, L.J.). Section 3 of the Human Rights Act provides that “‘so far as it 
is possible’ [to do so, all domestic] . . . legislation ‘must be read and given effect in a way which is 
compatible with Convention rights.’” Id. at 135 (Hobhouse, L.J.) (emphasis added). This 
parliamentary mandate, akin in some respects to our constitutional avoidance canon, has generated 
disagreement among the Law Lords; it has been interpreted by some judges to apply even if there is no 
ambiguity in the text being construed. See, e.g., Regina v. A. [2001] UKHL 25, [2001] 3 All E.R. 1, 17 
(U.K.) (Steyn, L.J.). 
 121. Wilson, [2003] 4 All E.R. at 117. 
 122. Id. at 117–18. The Human Rights Act allows British courts to make declarations of 
incompatibility but not to set aside Acts of Parliament that are inconsistent with Convention rights. For 
discussion of legal developments on compatibility under the 1998 Act, which became effective in 
October 2000, see Nicholas Bamforth, Courts in a Multi-Layered Constitution, in PUBLIC LAW IN A 
MULTI-LAYERED CONSTITUTION 277, 290–301 (Nicholas Bamforth & Peter Leyland eds., 2003); 
INGMAN, supra note 7, at 182–89; ZANDER, supra note 7, at 184–89.  
 123. Wilson, [2003] 4 All E.R. at 118–19. 
 124. Id. at 117. On the second “routine” use of Hansard, the court cited its earlier decision in 
Brind as an apt example. See supra text accompanying notes 36–37. 
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was not relevant to the issues a court must resolve in compatibility cases. 
In particular, a statute’s proportionality was to be addressed based on its 
text, not the quality of the reasons advanced by its proponents or the state 
of mind of ministers debating its merits.125 
The decisions since 2000 thus disclose a range of practical and 
conceptual misgivings associated with reliance on Hansard. Judges have 
complained about the excessive burdens that clients, counsel, and courts 
face in having to sift through parliamentary materials. Individual opinions 
have also articulated several possible grounds for limiting Hansard’s 
admissibility when construing the meaning of statutory text. These 
grounds include refusing to consider ministerial statements that address 
the scope of a discretionary government power, that bear on 
incompatibility under the Human Rights Acts, or that extend beyond 
estopping the government from contradicting in court what it previously 
said in Parliament. 
Despite such doubts, however, the Law Lords have by no means 
abandoned the basic rule of Pepper. From 2002 through 2005, Hansard 
materials were discussed by one or more panel members in forty out of 
some 250 decided cases—an average of ten per calendar year and roughly 
one-sixth of the Court’s decisions. There are a number of occasions where 
the Law Lords invoked Hansard for one of the purposes labeled 
“innocuous” in Wilson: to understand agency implementations of 
government policy that are subject to judicial review126 or to identify the 
 
 
 125. Wilson, [2003] 4 All E.R. at 119. As part of his analysis, Lord Nicholls cited with approval 
Lord Steyn’s Hart lecture, focusing on the “conceptual and constitutional difficulties” of treating the 
government’s intentions revealed in debate as reflecting the will of Parliament. Id. at 117. 
 A third possible limitation on the use of Hansard was raised by Lord Bingham in another case 
decided in 2003. See McDonnell v. Congregation of Christian Bros. Trs. [2003] UKHL 63, [2004] 1 
All E.R. 641, 653 (U.K.). In considering the meaning of a 1963 statute setting limitation periods for 
various claims, the Law Lords were referred to Hansard materials that had been off limits at the time 
(prior to 1992) the Court originally had construed the provision at issue. Lord Bingham opined that 
absent exceptional circumstances, it would be inappropriate for the Law Lords to invoke Hansard in 
order to depart from any authoritative statutory ruling rendered prior to Pepper. See id. This statement, 
however, seems unpersuasive given that the Law Lords in a unanimous 1993 decision had relied on 
Hansard to overrule an authoritative 1964 ruling by the Court of Appeal. See Stubbings v. Webb, 
[1993] 1 All Eng. 322, 328–29 (H.L. 1992) (U.K.) (Griffiths, L.J.). Despite his reservation as to the 
admissibility of Hansard in the McDonnell case, Lord Bingham went on to consider Hansard in his 
opinion, finding the parliamentary materials inconclusive on the issue presented. Id. at 653–54; see 
also Vogenauer, supra note 4, at 651–52 (expressing doubts that Lord Bingham’s view carries any 
authority). 
 126. See, e.g., A. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 3 All E.R. 169, 
187 (U.K.) (Bingham, L.J.), 226 (Hope, L.J.); Anderson v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2002] 
UKHL 46, [2002] 4 All E.R. 1089, 1104–05 (U.K.) (Steyn, L.J.); Saadi v. Sec’y of State for the Home 
Dep’t [2002] UKHL 41, [2002] 4 All E.R. 785, 789 (U.K.) (Slynn, L.J.). 
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background mischief at which a statute was aimed.127 Still, the largest 
single number of decisions involves reference to Hansard to shed light on 
the meaning of possibly inconclusive statutory words or phrases.128 
A recent broad-based discussion of Pepper and its applications took 
place in Jackson v. Attorney General,129 decided in October 2005. Nine 
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary participated in the decision. Jackson indicates 
that some Law Lords—although certainly not Lord Steyn—remain willing 
to apply Pepper in its more controversial sense. The case involved a 
challenge to the validity of the Hunting Act of 2004. The statute, which 
prohibited fox-hunting, had been enacted without approval from the House 
of Lords, consistent with a special procedure for bypassing the upper 
chamber that had been enacted in 1911 and modified in 1949.130 The real 
question presented was whether this special procedure, enacted as section 
2(1) of the 1911 law, authorized its own further modification by the 
Commons alone, as had occurred in 1949.131 The Court of Appeal had 
determined that the 1911 Act was inconclusive on its face and had relied 
extensively on parliamentary materials from 1911 to conclude that the 
 
 
 127. See, e.g., Regina v. Soneji [2005] UKHL 49, [2005] 4 All E.R. 321, 324–25 (U.K.) (Steyn, 
L.J.); Lesotho Highlands Dev. Auth. v. Impreglio [2005] UKHL 43, [2005] 3 All E.R. 789, 798–99 
(U.K.) (Steyn, L.J.); Ghaidan v. Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 3 All E.R. 411, 426–27 (U.K.) 
(Steyn, L.J.). 
 128. See, e.g., In re R. [2005] UKHL 33, [2005] 4 All E.R. 433, 437–38 (U.K.); Hooper v. Sec’y 
of State for Work & Pensions [2005] UKHL 29, [2006] 1 All E.R. 487, 503 (U.K.); Jindal Iron & Steel 
Co. Ltd. v. Islamic Solidarity Shipping Co. Inc. Jordan [2004] UKHL 49, [2005] 1 All E.R. 175, 187–
88 (U.K.); Mirvahedy v. Henley [2003] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 All E.R. 401, 438 (U.K.); Morgan 
Grenfell & Co. v. Special Comm’rs [2002] UKHL 21, [2002] 3 All E.R. 1, 10 (U.K.). From 2002 to 
2005, there were eighteen cases in which the Court referenced Hansard primarily for the purpose of 
helping to discern the meaning of statutory words, as opposed to nine cases where the principal focus 
of the Hansard discussion was on identifying the background mischief, and fourteen cases where 
Hansard was invoked primarily to help clarify government policy being subjected to judicial review. A 
similar distribution applies for cases invoking parliamentary materials in the period from 1996 through 
2001. Of the seventeen cases in which Hansard is referenced in one or more judicial opinions, nine 
instances involve primarily the meaning of statutory words, two relate primarily to identifying the 
background mischief, and six involve clarifying government policy subject to judicial review. These 
three different uses of Hansard are further discussed infra Part II.A and Part III.B. 
 129. [2005] UKHL 56, [2005] 4 All E.R. 1253 (U.K.). 
 130. See id. at 1256–57. 
 131. See id. The 1911 Act, approved by both houses, permitted the House of Commons to bypass 
the House of Lords and enact into law a bill approved by the Commons in three successive sessions, 
provided the period of time between second reading in the first session and passage in the third session 
was at least two years. Id. at 1262–63. The 1949 Act reduced the number of required Commons 
sessions approving the bill from three to two and the total elapsed time for all considerations from two 
years to one. Importantly, the 1949 Act was enacted without approval from the House of Lords. Id. at 
1256–57. 
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special procedure could lawfully be used to amend itself, and therefore 
that the 1949 Act modifications (as applied in 2004) were valid.132 
The Law Lords unanimously upheld the validity of the Hunting Act, 
dismissing the legal challenge to the 1949 law’s enactment under the 
special procedure. With respect to reliance on Hansard, Lord Bingham’s 
leading speech concluded that reference to the parliamentary debates and 
explanatory statements from ministers was unnecessary because the 1911 
text, properly understood, was neither ambiguous nor obscure.133 Lord 
Bingham did invoke Hansard, however, to establish how the record of 
amendments to section 2(1), considered by the Commons majority during 
a three-month period in 1911, helped illuminate the meaning of key words 
in that section. Specifically, section 2(1) as initially drafted had applied its 
special procedure to “‘any Public Bill other than a Money Bill.’”134 Over 
the ensuing months, the Commons considered at least nine amendments 
proposing to enlarge the class of bills to which the new special procedure 
would not apply.135 Observing that one of these amendments was accepted 
but eight were “uniformly rejected” by the Commons, Lord Bingham 
concluded, “[I]t is clear from the historical background that Parliament did 
intend the word ‘any,’ subject to the noted exceptions [in text], to mean 
exactly what it said.”136 
Thus, although Lord Bingham’s lead speech made a point of eschewing 
reliance on ministerial statements offered in the course of parliamentary 
debate, it relied directly on the statute’s drafting history—recorded in 
Hansard but hardly obvious from the face of the text as finally enacted—to 
help explain the meaning of statutory words. Lord Nicholls in a concurring 
speech was prepared to go further with Hansard. He concluded that section 
2(1) was sufficiently clear, but he also believed that the ministerial 
statements made during parliamentary passage of the 1911 Act were 
valuable to confirm the apparent meaning of the text.137 Citing to 
statements by the Prime Minister among others, Lord Nicholls urged open 
recognition of their relevance in the interests of transparency.138 
On the other side, Lord Steyn (also concurring in the result) restated his 
preference that resort to Hansard to discover the intended meaning of 
enacted text be limited only to situations of estoppel against the 
 
 
 132. See Jackson v. Att’y Gen., [2005] 2 W.L.R. 866, 889–92 (C.A. 2005) (U.K.). 
 133. [2005] 4 All E.R. at 1271. 
 134. See id. at 1263 (emphasis added). 
 135. See id. at 1263–64. 
 136. See id. at 1268. 
 137. See id. at 1276. 
 138. Id. at 1276–77. 
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government.139 He was content here, however, to rely on Pepper’s three-
part test and exclude Hansard references because the text itself was 
clear.140 Lord Walker, Lord Carswell, and Lord Brown opined more 
briefly that resort to Hansard was unnecessary in this case.141  
An even more recent indication of Pepper’s continuing vitality 
occurred in July 2006, when three members of the Law Lords made a 
point of observing that reliance on Hansard remains valuable as an aid to 
the construction of text—including text that is not ambiguous or obscure. 
In Harding v. Wealands,142 Lord Hoffmann—who had voiced misgivings 
about Pepper in some prior opinions—delivered a leading speech in which 
he relied at length on parliamentary proceedings to help explain what the 
word “procedure” meant in a private international law statute, even though 
he regarded the term as clear without resorting to Hansard.143 Lord Rodger 
applied a similar analysis, noting that available Hansard materials not only 
confirmed but also strengthened the textual construction he would have 
offered anyway.144 Lord Carswell added a hopeful gloss on the court’s 
extended travails regarding legislative history. He characterized Pepper as 
having been “out of judicial favour in recent years,” but expressed regret 
over this development, adding that ministerial statements were at times 
useful as an interpretive resource, “perhaps especially as a confirmatory 
aid.”145 
To sum up, the Law Lords in 2006 continue to rely on Hansard 
materials as an aid to statutory interpretation, albeit less enthusiastically 
than they did in the first fifteen months after Pepper was decided. There is 
reason to believe that lower courts refer to Hansard with some regularity 
as well, although such usage is beyond the scope of this article.146 Lord 
 
 
 139. Id. at 1285. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1297 (Walker, L.J.), 1304 (Carswell, L.J.), 1310 (Brown, L.J.). Even brevity could not 
conceal some differences: Lord Walker acknowledged disagreement among his colleagues on the 
application of Pepper but “preferr[ed] to express no view” on the matter, id. at 1297, while Lord 
Carswell discounted Lord Bingham’s use of parliamentary materials by declaring that he had taken no 
account of defeated or withdrawn amendments, the history of which was recorded in Hansard, id. at 
1304. The three remaining panel members—Lord Hope, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, and Baroness Hale 
of Richmond—delivered separate opinions but did not comment on the Hansard issues. See id. at 
1287–97, 1298–1303. 
 142. [2006] UKHL 32, [2006] 4 All E.R. 1 (U.K.). 
 143. See id. at 12–13. 
 144. See id. at 23. 
 145. Id. at 25 (emphasis added). A fourth panel member, Lord Woolf, also embraced the utility of 
Pepper to illuminate the meaning of statutory language if the text is unclear. See id. at 6. 
 146. See, e.g., Lewis v. Eliades [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1758, [2004] 1 W.L.R. 692, 702–03 (C.A. 
2003); Matthews v. Ministry of Def. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 773, [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2621, 2639–40 (C.A. 
2002); Sunderland Polytechnic v. Evans, [1993] I.R.L.R. 196, 196 (Employment Appeal Tribunal). 
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Steyn’s proposal to restrict judicial uses of Hansard to estoppel situations 
remains on the table, but it seems doubtful that most current Lords of 
Appeal would endorse it.147 Practical concerns based on cost-benefit 
calculations have arisen with some frequency in various judicial opinions. 
At the same time, one member of the Law Lords has derided the 
“traditionalists” for acting “as if to be seen openly to read Hansard is akin 
to being caught with pornography,”148 and it is well known that judges 
privately acknowledge looking at Hansard considerably more often than 
they cite to it in their opinions.149 
II. WHY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY USAGE REMAINS GREATER IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
At this point, it is appropriate to ask what, if any, lessons for American 
statutory interpretation can be gleaned from the intricate yet somewhat 
muddled state of affairs in Britain. Does the Supreme Court rely on 
legislative history more or less frequently than its British counterpart? Do 
the two legal cultures place the same value on legislative history as an 
interpretive resource? Do they espouse similar justifications for its use? 
Are there differences in the two law-making systems that can help explain 
why judicial reliance might be greater in one country than the other? In an 
effort to answer these and related questions, I turn to the perspective 
afforded by comparative analysis. 
 
 
See generally Kenny Mullan, The Impact of Pepper v. Hart, in THE HOUSE OF LORDS: ITS 
PARLIAMENTARY AND JUDICIAL ROLES 213, 216–17, 229–33 (Paul Carmichael & Brice Dickson eds., 
1999); Vogenauer, supra note 4, at 635, 639–42. 
 147. As discussed in this Part, Lord Steyn and Lord Hope have embraced the notion that Hansard 
should be invoked to aid courts in construing statutory words or phrases only if warranted to estop the 
executive from abandoning prior representations, while Lord Nicholls and Lord Bingham have 
effectively rejected this position. Lord Steyn has stepped down as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, and as 
of August 2007, he will be mandatorily retired from participating in judicial business. See The United 
Kingdom Parliament, The Law Lords, www.parliament.uk/about_lords/the_law_lords.cfm (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2006). Meanwhile, Lords Hoffmann, Rodger, Carswell, and Woolf also have eschewed the 
proposed estoppel restriction, declaring as a general matter that Hansard remains a valuable aid for 
construing statutory text. See also Philip Sales, Pepper v. Hart: A Footnote to Professor Vogenauer’s 
Reply to Lord Steyn, 26 O.J.L.S. 585, 585–86 (2006) (contending that estoppel rationale has never 
been adopted as binding by the Law Lords). 
 148. Robin Cooke, The Road Ahead for the Common Law, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 273, 282 
(2004). Lord Cooke, formerly President of the New Zealand Court of Appeals, participated on more 
than forty Law Lords panels between 1996 and 2001. See infra note 158 (discussing search methods 
for individual judicial opinions). 
 149. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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A. Empirical Observations 
For quantitative purposes, I have chosen to compare the Law Lords’ 
legislative history references from 1996 through 2005 with legislative 
history treatment by the Supreme Court during the same ten-year period. 
The comparisons are less than perfect because the universes of cases being 
reviewed are not identical. On the British side, I have included all 
decisions with opinions by the Law Lords from January 1996 through 
December 2005—a total of 591 cases. On the U.S. side, I have focused on 
two subsets of Supreme Court decisions from 1996 through 2005 on which 
I had readily obtainable data: cases that directly addressed some aspect of 
the employment relationship (labor and employment decisions),150 and 
cases that involved interpretation of federal tax statutes (tax decisions).151 
These two subsets of the Supreme Court’s overall decision docket 
comprise 145 decisions—roughly one-fifth of all decisions with published 
opinions during the ten-year period.152 They also reflect some variation 
with regard to politicized aspects of the Court’s docket. Labor and 
employment cases more often present public policy questions in direct or 
explicit form, whereas tax cases tend to be technical and less ideologically 
charged. The tax decisions consist only of cases that involve the 
interpretation of a federal tax statute and thus are more likely to include 
references to legislative history than data sets that have common law and 
 
 
 150. The ten years of labor and employment law cases are part of a data set compiled by the 
author that consists of more than 650 cases decided between November 1969 and June 2006. The 
dataset has been discussed in recent articles analyzing judicial reasoning. See, e.g., Brudney & 
Ditslear, supra note 8; James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive 
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of 
Construction]. For discussion of how the data set was assembled, see id. at 15–16. 
 151. The ten years of tax law cases are part of a data set consisting of some three hundred cases 
decided between November 1953 and December 2005 that was compiled by a team of law professors 
and social scientists. See Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1909 (2005); Lee Epstein et al., Judging Statutes: Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and 
Notes for a Project on the Internal Revenue Code, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 305 (2003). For a 
discussion of how the data set was assembled, see Staudt et al., supra, at 1926–27. 
 152. The Supreme Court decided some 750 cases with published opinions in the ten Terms from 
1996 through 2005. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, tbl. 2-11 (3d ed. 
2003); Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Statistics for the Supreme Court’s October Term 2005, 75 
U.S. L. Wk., July 18, 2006, at 3029. Between January 1996 and December 2005, the Supreme Court 
issued 127 labor and employment decisions and 24 tax decisions. Six of these cases appear in both 
data sets: they are decisions directly involving employees or their interests that also involve 
interpretation of a federal tax statute. The six have been included in the tax decisions data set only, in 
order to avoid duplication. The author, ably assisted by Chad Eggspuehler (class of 2009 at The Ohio 
State University Moritz College of Law), compiled the labor and employment and tax decisions, 
including the six overlapping cases, by searching the data sets identified supra note 151. Copies of the 
lists are available from the author. 
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constitutional decisions mixed in as well.153 Still, the two subsets of 
Supreme Court decisions, relating to separate areas of federal law, offer 
useful benchmarks for assessing whether recent British judicial interest in 
legislative history equals or approaches U.S. judicial investment in this 
interpretive resource. 
For the two U.S. data sets, I report not only the numbers of cases in 
which one or more of the Justices reference or discuss legislative history, 
but also the numbers of cases where the majority affirmatively relies on 
legislative history as a probative or determining factor in its reasoning 
process. Use of legislative history as an asset to justify or buttress the 
Court’s holding is more powerful—and less frequent—than the total of all 
legislative history references. Instances of reliance on legislative history 
do not include cases in which the majority merely descriptively references 
legislative history in the course of discussion, or references it in a 
“deflecting” manner so as to dismiss the value ascribed to it by a litigant, a 
lower court, or a dissenting justice.154 Both reliance and overall reference 
are important and worth noting, and reporting them separately allows for a 
more nuanced appreciation of legislative history usage by the Supreme 
Court. 
I did not include a similar distinction for the Law Lords, however, 
because it was impracticable to do so. The Law Lords do not issue 
formally designated majority opinions.155 The leading speech may 
announce a result that other panel members endorse in their speeches, but 
in many instances these additional speeches do not include cross-
references to the Hansard-related reasoning of speeches delivered by 
colleagues, nor even to the leading speech in the case.156 Accordingly, it is 
 
 
 153. The Law Lords decisions include such non-statutory cases, as does the Supreme Court labor 
and employment data set. Law Lords cases that do not raise statutory issues typically involve matters 
of common law. Based on my review of the Law Lords data set, these decisions comprise roughly 
fifteen percent of the 591 cases decided from 1996 through 2005. Supreme Court labor and 
employment cases that do not raise issues of federal statutory law almost always involve constitutional 
questions. My search of this data set indicates that the non-statutory decisions were about ten percent 
of the 127 cases decided during the same ten years. Lists of these non-statutory cases decided by both 
Courts are available from the author. In addition, unlike the tax law data set, the labor and employment 
decisions also include cases that focus on jurisdictional questions, evidentiary matters, and issues of 
state law. Such issues may, in the aggregate, be less likely to implicate legislative history than 
traditionally doctrinal matters of federal statutory interpretation. 
 154. For further discussion of this distinction between reliance on and reference to legislative 
history, see Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 150, at 24–26. 
 155. The Law Lords’ more individualistic style of judicial opinions stems in part from their 
structure of decision making. Sitting typically in panels of five judges, the twelve Lords of Appeal in 
Ordinary are unlikely to express either methodological or doctrinal positions with the coherence of our 
Supreme Court, which decides all cases en banc. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 97, at 24–26. 
 156. See, e.g., Regina v. Soneji [2005] UKHL 49, [2005] 4 All E.R. 321, 334–42 (U.K.) (Rodger 
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simply too precarious to assume that one Lord of Appeal’s reliance on, 
dismissal of, or citation to Hansard materials is endorsed on any regular 
basis by others who approve the same outcome. 
Finally, in making the comparison between British and U.S. legislative 
history treatment, I have divided the ten-year period into two equal 
intervals. Legislative history references are identified for each five-year 
interval as well as for the entire ten years. Table One reports all results for 
the 1996−2005 period.  
TABLE ONE—LEGISLATIVE HISTORY TREATMENT 1996–2005: 
PERCENTAGE OF DECISIONS* INVOKING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY157 
 1996−2000 2001−2005 Total 
Law Lords Usage 5.6% (15) 13.4% (43) 9.8% (58) 
Supreme Court:  
 Lab. & Emp. Reference 
 Lab. & Emp. Reliance 
 Tax Reference 
 Tax Reliance 
 
37% (25) 
25% (17) 
64% (7) 
55% (6) 
 
54% (29) 
30% (16) 
69% (9) 
23% (3) 
 
45% (54) 
27% (33) 
67% (16) 
38% (9) 
 
*Actual numbers of Law Lords decisions using legislative history, or 
Supreme Court decisions referring to/relying on legislative history, for each 
time period are in parentheses. 
As Table One indicates, the Law Lords made use of Hansard materials 
in at least one judicial opinion in 9.8 percent of the decisions issued 
between 1996 and 2005—58 of 591 cases. Usage has been fairly pervasive 
rather than being confined to a handful of individual judges. Over the ten-
year period, the fifty-eight identified cases include ninety-four judicial 
opinions expressly invoking legislative history. Of the twenty-four Lords 
 
 
& Cullen, L.JJ.) (reaching same result as Lord Steyn but without endorsing his reasoning or discussion 
of Hansard); Kuddus v. Chief Constable [2001] UKHL 29, [2001] 3 All E.R. 193 (U.K.) (Slynn, 
Mackay, Nicholls, Hutton & Scott, L.JJ.) (reaching same result, with Lords Slynn, Mackay, and 
Nicholls invoking Hansard, but with no opinion endorsing the reasoning of any other). See generally 
John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447, 489 (2001). 
 157. “Law Lords usage” includes any decision in which at least one judicial opinion addresses or 
relies upon Hansard materials. See supra note 79 (describing search strategy). Similarly, “Supreme 
Court reference” includes any decision in which at least one Justice’s opinion addresses legislative 
history in substantive terms. See supra notes 150–51 (referring to sources that describe how data sets 
were assembled). “Supreme Court reliance” includes only those decisions in which the Court’s 
majority opinion relies on legislative history to help explain or justify the holding. See supra notes 
150–51. 
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of Appeal in Ordinary who served on more than fifteen panels during this 
period, eighteen Lords referred to Hansard in at least one judicial 
opinion.158 Some members of the Court made greater use of parliamentary 
materials than others: four Lords of Appeal (Bingham, Hoffmann, Hope, 
and Steyn) discussed Hansard in at least nine of their opinions, and 
another five (Goff, Hobhouse, Hutton, Nicholls, and Slynn) referred to 
Hansard materials on either four or five separate occasions. In 2005, the 
last year covered by Table One, six of the twelve sitting Lords of Appeal 
invoked legislative history materials in two or more opinions. 
The figures in Table One also reveal an intriguing tension between the 
tenor of legislative history debates in the United States and Britain on the 
one hand, and the reality of the two countries’ legislative history usage on 
the other. In the United States, Justice Scalia has consistently criticized the 
use of legislative history as an aid to interpretation,159 and he has been 
joined by some other prominent jurists160 and legal academics.161 There is 
considerable evidence that Justice Scalia’s position has influenced the 
Supreme Court’s use of legislative history; the Court’s reliance on this 
interpretive resource has noticeably declined in the years since his arrival 
in 1986.162 In Britain, Pepper v. Hart opened the door to legislative history 
 
 
 158. Five of the six who did not refer to Hansard had two years or less of active service during this 
decade, and one of those (Lord Mustill, who retired in March 1997) had invoked Hansard in four 
opinions authored prior to 1996. In addition, two other distinguished jurists, Lord Cooke and Lord 
Mackay of Clashfern, who participated on Law Lords panels during this period, also invoked Hansard 
in their opinions. Law Lords membership for the 1996–2005 period was compiled from the respective 
volumes of All England Law Reports, which list Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (and other Lords who 
have held high judicial office and are eligible to hear appeals) at the front of each volume. See also 
Email from Helen McMurdo, Committee Assistant, Law Lords Office, to Chad Eggspuehler (Sept. 26, 
2006) (on file with author). Data on Hansard references in the opinions of individual Lords of Appeal 
was compiled by the author, assisted very capably by Chad Eggspuehler. 
 159. See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1990–91 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 535–37 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); Wis. Pub. 
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 616–23 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); ANTONIN SCALIA, A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29–37 (Amy Gutmann et al. eds., 
1997). 
 160. See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia & Thomas, J.J., 
concurring); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.); Wallace v. 
Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559–60 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
 161. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 87–90, 102–16 (2006); John 
F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 696–706 (1997); John 
Copeland Nagle, The Worst Statutory Interpretation Case in History, 94 NW. L. REV. 1445, 1468–69 
(2000). 
 162. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 8, at 222–24 (reporting a decline in labor and 
employment cases since 1985, including in opinions authored by some liberal Justices); Koby, supra 
note 8, at 384–95 (reporting a decline since the 1980s, especially in opinions authored by more 
conservative Justices); Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme 
Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 212–20 (2000) (reporting a decline from 1987 to 1994). See generally 
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usage starting in the early 1990s. Some legal academics and jurists have 
bemoaned the new propensity to refer to Hansard,163 but as Table One 
indicates, citations to and discussions of parliamentary materials by the 
Law Lords have increased over the most recent five-year period. 
The bottom line, however, is that the Supreme Court continues to 
invoke legislative history far more often than do the Law Lords, although 
the American dialogue has highlighted diminished usage and the British 
debate has focused on excessive references. From 1996 to 2005, Hansard 
materials were considered by at least one panel member in 9.8 percent of 
the 591 Law Lords decisions, whereas legislative history materials were 
discussed by at least one Supreme Court Justice in 48.3 percent of the 145 
reviewed cases.164 Even when comparing the Supreme Court’s reliance on 
legislative history in majority opinions against the Law Lords’ references 
to legislative history in individual judicial speeches, Supreme Court 
reliance over the past decade—29.0 percent of the 145 reviewed majority 
opinions—is roughly three times greater than the Law Lords’ record of 
references. When the comparison is closer to apples and apples—between 
references to legislative history by judges on the two highest courts—that 
history is invoked about five times more often by the Supreme Court. 
One must be careful to keep these rather dramatic differences in 
perspective. The overall caseload for the Law Lords is not as heavily 
statutory as are the tax law and workplace law decisions examined by the 
Supreme Court.165 Accordingly, the Supreme Court cases reviewed here 
are somewhat more likely to trigger references to legislative history. At the 
same time, the 9.8 percent figure includes instances in which Hansard is 
referenced not for traditional statutory interpretation reasons but rather 
because parliamentary statements by ministers help the court to understand 
 
 
Manning, supra note 15. 
 163. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Congregation of Christian Brothers Trs. [2003] UKHL 63 [2004], 1 
All E.R. 641, 655–56 (U.K.) (Steyn, L.J.); Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd. [2003] UKHL 40, [2003] 
4 All E.R. 97, 130–31 (U.K.) (Hope, L.J.); Robinson v. Sec’y of State [2002] UKHL 32, [2002] N. Ir. 
L.R. 390, 404–05 (Hoffmann, L.J.); Baker supra note 4; Marshall, supra note 97; Summers, supra 
note 97.  
 164. The figure 48.3 percent is derived from the data in Table One: out of 145 Supreme Court 
decisions, seventy (fifty-four labor and employment and sixteen tax) referenced legislative history. 
Similarly, in forty-two of the 145 Supreme Court majority opinions (thirty-three labor and 
employment and nine tax), or twenty-nine percent, the majority author relied on legislative history. 
 165. The “non-statutory” component of the Law Lords docket is not as substantial in recent times 
as some might suppose. See supra note 153 (reporting that about fifteen percent of the 591 Law Lords 
decisions from 1996 through 2005 do not raise statutory issues). Still, this fifteen percent figure 
exceeds the ten percent estimate of non-statutory cases for Supreme Court labor and employment 
decisions. See supra note 153. In addition, all twenty-four Supreme Court tax decisions involve issues 
of statutory interpretation. See supra text accompanying note 153. 
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agency policies that are being challenged as arbitrary or fundamentally 
unfair.166 When those references are omitted, the remaining uses of 
Hansard—to assist the court in construing the particular words or general 
purpose of the statute itself—arise in only 6.4 percent of the 591 
decisions.167 
It is also relevant that the Law Lords continue to cite to pre-legislative 
historical materials such as White Papers and commission reports as 
helpful in identifying the mischief behind a statute. In the United States, 
the primary source for such purpose-related background information is 
legislative history—especially committee reports. 
Because White Papers and commission reports are invoked with some 
frequency, it seems appropriate to calculate the Law Lords’ references to 
these pre-legislative materials over the same ten-year period. From 1996 
through 2005, sixty-nine additional Law Lords decisions—11.7 percent of 
the total—include a judicial opinion that refers to White Papers and/or 
commission reports.168 My summary review of these references suggests 
that a fair number involved merely de minimis mention, something that 
was rarely true for references to Hansard during the ten-year period.169 But 
assuming arguendo that all such references are to be treated identically, the 
combined number of cases in which either Hansard or pre-legislative 
historical materials are invoked comes to 21.3 percent of the total—still 
less than one-half the level of Supreme Court references to legislative 
history. 
One interesting feature of the Law Lords’ use of White Papers and 
commission reports is that these references virtually doubled during the 
second half of the ten-year period—from 7.8 percent in 1996−2000 to 14.9 
 
 
 166. See supra note 126 and accompanying text; and infra notes 293–94 and accompanying text. 
 167. Of the thirty-eight cases in which one or more panel members invoked Hansard for the 
traditional statutory interpretation reasons, twenty-seven cases involved references primarily related to 
the specific meaning of statutory words, while in eleven cases the principal focus was on the more 
general purpose or mischief at which the statute was aimed. See supra note 128 (reporting this 
breakdown for two sub-periods from 1996 to 2005). 
 168. Cases invoking White Papers or Commission Reports were identified by following the Lexis 
search: ((White Paper!) or (Commission w/s Report!)). After removing duplicates and false positives, 
the search identified 101 decisions, thirty-two of which also included one or more opinions invoking 
Hansard. 
 169. See, e.g., Ward v. Comm’r of Police [2005] UKHL 32, [2005] 3 All E.R. 1013, 1017 (U.K.) 
(Hale, B.) (briefly mentioning Royal Commission Report); Transco v. Stockport Metro. Borough 
Council [2003] UKHL 61, [2004] 1 All E.R. 589, 593 (U.K.) (Bingham, L.J.) (briefly mentioning Law 
Commission Report). The Law Lords’ references that were more than de minimis were made to assist 
in identifying the mischief or purpose at which the statute was aimed. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Sec’y of 
State for Home Dept. [2005] UKHL 14, [2005] 2 All E.R. 240, 252–53 (U.K.) (Bingham, L.J.) 
(referring to White Paper); Mark v. Mark [2005] UKHL 42, [2005] 3 All E.R. 912, 925–26 (U.K.) 
(Hale, B.) (referring to Law Commission Report). 
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percent in 2001−2005.170 Given that the proportion of decisions with 
Hansard references more than doubled during this same decade—from 5.6 
percent in 1996−2000 to 13.4 percent in 2001−2005—it would appear that 
the Law Lords are investing more time and thought generally in the 
interpretive potential of historical materials related to the legislative 
process. 
I explore some implications of this apparent trend in Part III. 
Meanwhile, however, the gap between current legislative history usage by 
the Supreme Court and the Law Lords remains substantial and warrants 
some attempt at explanation. 
B. Similar Rationales for Valuing Legislative History 
Before suggesting factors that account for the sharp differences in 
legislative history usage between the Law Lords and the Supreme Court, it 
is worth noting that there are important similarities in their approaches as 
well. Legislative history advocates on the two Courts have adopted much 
the same basic justifications for valuing that history as an interpretive 
asset. As part of this support, legislative history proponents have 
responded in analogous terms to certain practical and conceptual 
objections voiced by critics in both countries. 
In Pepper v. Hart, Lord Browne-Wilkinson reasoned that allowing 
courts to rely on parliamentary materials as an aid to construing 
ambiguous text would help enforce Parliament’s true intent and thereby 
strengthen legislative supremacy.171 Applying the new rule of Pepper to 
the facts at hand, he further concluded that the exchanges between the 
minister and members of Parliament were sufficiently prominent, clearly 
articulated, and contextually persuasive to justify attributing to Parliament 
as a whole the understanding and intent expressed by the minister.172 
The principle of reasonably imputed institutional approval is also 
central to judicial rationales for relying on legislative history in the 
Supreme Court setting. Justice Stevens, referring to Congress’s 
committee-based system of drafting and commenting on bills, has 
 
 
 170. If one includes the thirty-two decisions in which the Law Lords invoked both Hansard and 
pre-legislative materials, there is a parallel increase for the larger group of 101 cases—from 11.2 
percent in 1996–2000 to 22.0 percent in 2001–05. 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 52–53. 
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 70–73; see also Regina v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t, 
Transp. & Regions ex parte Spath Holme Ltd., [2001] 1 All E.R. 195, 216 (H.L. 2000) (U.K.) 
(Nicholls, L.J.) (discussing use of contextual materials, including legislative history, to aid in the 
judicial task of reasonably imputing intent to Parliament). 
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concluded that busy representatives and senators may appropriately be 
deemed to have relied on committee reports and the explanations 
contained therein to help capture the meaning or implications of the text 
on which they have voted.173 Justice Stevens has further observed that a 
failure by the Court to infer congressional approval from suitably 
prominent and well-reasoned legislative history ignores persuasive 
evidence of congressional intent and disrespects the lawmaking supremacy 
accorded to the legislative branch.174 
Similarly, Justice Breyer and Justice Souter each have maintained that 
identifying a statute’s underlying purpose—very often with the help of 
legislative history—can provide essential guidance as to the meaning of 
enacted text.175 That purpose too is imputed on the basis of what a 
reasonable member of Congress would have had in mind.176 The purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation has long been embraced by British 
courts as well,177 and the Court in Pepper relied on Hansard’s role in 
enabling it to discern legislative purpose as part of its justification for 
admitting parliamentary materials.178 
One additional dimension of each Court’s rationale for using legislative 
history is that its supporters regard this resource as clarifying or probative 
rather than conclusive. Proponents acknowledge that there are risks of 
misuse and that legislative history is not binding on a court reviewing the 
meaning of text. At the same time, incidents of misuse are viewed as 
 
 
 173. See Bank One Chic., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276–77 (1996) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). This has been referred to as the “busy Congress” rationale. See Tiefer, supra 
note 162, at 209, 252–53.  
 174. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 175. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
85–88 (2005); United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 516 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J.) 
(plurality opinion). 
 176. See BREYER, supra note 175, at 88, 93–94. 
 177. See, e.g., Regina v. Z. [2005] UKHL 35, [2005] 3 All E.R. 95, 109 (U.K.) (Woolf, L.J.); 
Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, 64–65, 71 (H.L. 1992) (U.K.) (Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.). See 
generally Zenon Bankowski & D. Neil MacCormick, Statutory Interpretation in the United Kingdom, 
in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 359, 367 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. 
Summers eds., 1991); Robert G. Vaughn, A Comparative Analysis of the Influence of Legislative 
History on Judicial Decision-Making and Legislation, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 26–28 (1996). 
 178. See supra text accompanying note 54. For a thoughtful discussion of how intent is imputed to 
legislatures and other group actors on philosophical and linguistic grounds, see Lawrence M. Solan, 
Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 
GEO. L.J. 427, 437–53 (2005); see also Vaughn, supra note 177, at 40–41 (contending that legislative 
history reliance to help identify purpose constrains judicial discretion by inhibiting judges from letting 
their own preferences “masquerade[e]” as those of Parliament); Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The 
Modern Parol Evidence Rule and its Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. 
L.J. 195, 198 (1988) (contending that extrinsic evidence will mitigate, not aggravate, judicial bias in 
the area of contract interpretation).  
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anecdotal rather than systemic; accordingly, reservations about reliance on 
legislative history are properly understood as going to the weight ascribed 
to such history in a given setting, not its admissibility in some larger 
sense.179 
Apart from sharing basic rationales, legislative history proponents in 
Britain and the United States have had to respond to similar concerns 
about its utility and legitimacy. A major practical objection voiced on both 
sides of the Atlantic involves difficulties of access for practicing attorneys 
and others seeking to understand and comply with the law. The court in 
Pepper acknowledged this concern but concluded that it would have 
minimal impact. The lead opinion asserted that projected research costs 
were exaggerated and observed that attorneys and their clients were 
adequately managing the analogous logistical and financial challenge of 
gaining access to often obscure agency regulations.180 
In the United States, Justice Jackson expressed similar concerns about 
lack of access to legislative history in a 1953 Supreme Court case.181 
These concerns, however, appear to have been overstated even then, at 
least with regard to congressional committee reports and floor debates.182 
Moreover, access to legislative history is even less problematic today 
given online capabilities available through Westlaw and Lexis, and also 
non-fee services.183 Cost remains a relevant factor, but as with Hansard, 
the expenses involved in securing access to legislative history are 
perceived as not materially different from the costs associated with 
reviewing or monitoring agency regulations.184 
 
 
 179. See, e.g., Regina v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t Transp. & Regions ex parte Spath Holme 
Ltd., [2001] 1 All E.R. 195, 218 (H.L. 2000) (U.K.) (Nicholls, L.J.), 223 (Cooke, L.J.); Nat’l Fed’n of 
Fed. Employees v. Dep’t of the Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 96 (1999) (Breyer, J.). See generally Vogenauer, 
supra note 4, at 658–65; James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretation of 
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 49–56, 58–59 (1994). 
 180. See supra text accompanying notes 56–57. 
 181. See United States v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 345 U.S. 295, 319–21 (1953) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 182. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1247–52 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994) (noting that at the time there were three or more depository libraries for U.S. government 
documents in every state, and that committee reports as well as the Congressional Record were 
routinely collected in these libraries).  
 183. For example, committee reports are available from 1995 onward, and the Congressional 
Record is available from 1989 onward, at Thomas, Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last 
visited May 15, 2007). Reports and floor debates from 1994 onward are also available through the 
U.S. Government Printing Office website, GPO Access Home Page, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ (last 
visited May 15, 2007).  
 184. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 845, 868–69 (1992). Related to concerns about access, critics in both countries have 
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Admittedly, electronic access may be somewhat more problematic with 
respect to Hansard than for core legislative history materials in the United 
States. Parliamentary debates and proceedings are not available online as 
far back as the U.S. materials, nor can they be searched as efficiently as 
can House and Senate committee reports and the Congressional Record.185 
On the other hand, Britain is roughly one-fortieth the size of the United 
States,186 and attorneys in Britain generally will not have to travel as far as 
their American counterparts to locate basic legislative history materials in 
hard-copy form. 
An often-voiced conceptual criticism of reliance on legislative history 
is that it wrongly presumes the existence of a coherent legislative intent. 
The concern is both that collective entities such as Parliament and 
Congress are not capable of having a single or uniform intention and that 
even if such an intention could be hypothesized, it could not be sensibly 
extrapolated from isolated fragments of the legislative record.187 For 
present purposes, it is not necessary to evaluate these criticisms of 
intentionalism other than noting that legislative history advocates in both 
countries have essentially responded to them in the same ways. 
Proponents on the Supreme Court and the Law Lords have endorsed 
the view that the legislative process possesses a baseline measure of 
 
 
expressed concern that judges would not be sophisticated enough to sift through legislative history and 
accurately discern the implications of various statements or exchanges. See supra text accompanying 
note 58 (referring to British concern); Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 21–22 (1990) [hereinafter Stat. Interp. Hrg.] (statement of 
Judge James L. Buckley) (presenting American concern). Legislative history advocates have basically 
dismissed these concerns as overstated, again noting that judges must separate wheat from chaff with 
respect to other contextual resources as well. See, e.g., Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, 66 (H.L. 
1992) (U.K.); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 287 (1995). 
 185. Hansard is available back to the 1988 session at United Kingdom Parliament, Hansard 
(Debate), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pahansard.htm (last visited May 15, 2007). The 
site has a search feature and makes the Daily and Bound Volume Index available for particular 
sessions. Relevant debates may be located by searching for the speaker (if known) or subject terms. In 
the United States, Westlaw provides the U.S. Code Congressional & Administrative News 
(U.S.C.C.A.N.) online back to 1948, allowing access to key committee reports and Congressional 
Record references accompanying enacted bills. In addition, the Congressional Record is available on 
Westlaw and Lexis Nexis from 1985 forward, committee reports are available from 1990 forward, and 
committee hearings are available from 1993–94 forward. Using the CIS/Index, a comprehensive list of 
legislative history documents can be generated by searching with the bill number. The CIS/Index also 
can be searched by key word and speaker. 
 186. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2005, at 841, 843 (William A. McGeveran, 
Jr. et al. eds., 2006 ed.) (reporting that Britain comprises 94,525 square miles and the United States 
3,718,709 square miles). 
 187. For some discussion of the argument against intentionalism in the British setting, see 
Vogenauer, supra note 4, at 632–33, 655, and sources cited therein. For discussion of the same 
argument in the American context, see Manning, supra note 161, at 684–89, and sources cited therein. 
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coherence. They accept at least implicitly that legislators who agree a 
certain text should become law are able to reach a broadly shared 
understanding of the purpose(s) leading to a bill’s introduction and 
enactment, and they are further willing to infer that these same legislators 
may at times adopt a common perspective on the meaning and 
implications of certain specific provisions.188 Whether statements found in 
Hansard or congressional materials should be sensibly construed as part of 
such a common perspective depends on the identity of the speaker, the 
nature and visibility of his presentation, the reasoned elaboration 
contained in his remarks, and other factors that will vary from one 
statutory setting to the next. Thus, proponents would argue, the challenge 
of deriving persuasive evidence of intent from various pieces of the 
legislative history record is a practical problem, not a conceptual one.  
Finally, there is a persistent separation of powers objection to 
legislative history in both legal cultures: it is illegitimate to allow the 
unenacted intentions of legislators to trump the authority of enacted text or 
to usurp the interpretive role of courts.189 Once again, the responses given 
by the court in Pepper parallel those propounded in the United States. 
Legislative history, like other contextual resources, plays a supplemental 
role in that it helps attribute meaning to the actual statutory language. A 
court’s reliance on this history to understand what Congress or Parliament 
has enacted is no more a usurpation of the judicial role than is reliance on 
canons of construction, the dictionary, or prior agency interpretive 
practice.190 
 
 
 188. See, e.g., Pepper, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 71 (Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.); Reg. v. Sec’y of State 
for the Env’t Transp. & Regions ex parte Spath Holme Ltd., [2001] 1 All E.R. at 219–23 (H.L. 2000) 
(U.K.) (Cooke, L.J.); supra notes 173–76 (statements of Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter). For 
commentary from scholars in both countries supporting the view that legislation is a fundamentally 
purposive or intentional enterprise, see, for example, Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE 
AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 257–68 (Robert P. George ed., 1996); Stefan 
Vogenauer, What is the Proper Role of Legislative Intention in Judicial Interpretation?, 18 STATUTE 
L. REV. 235, 237–41 (1997); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the 
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 195–96 (1986); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 649 (1999). 
 189. See, e.g., discussion of Pepper supra text accompanying note 25; Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452–53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375–76 
(1987). 
 190. See, e.g., Pepper, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 69; Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 184, at 6–7, 18–19 
(statement of Judge Patricia Wald). 
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C. Key Differences in Legislative Process and Structure 
The similarities in certain basic rationales and responses summarized 
above contribute to an understanding of why the highest Courts in both 
Britain and the United States value legislative history as an interpretive 
resource. There are, however, a number of important differences between 
the two countries in terms of legislative processes and structures. Notably, 
in contrast to Britain’s parliamentary system, the congressional lawmaking 
enterprise confers a central role on standing committees, it regularly 
requires negotiation and compromise to achieve success, and it includes 
multiple decisional moments captured by distinct forms of internal 
commentary. These differences—separately explored below—help 
account for why Supreme Court reliance on legislative history is more 
robust than that of the Law Lords.  
1. Standing Committees and Committee Reports 
Among legislative history proponents in the United States, committee 
reports are regarded as especially useful in shedding light on the meaning 
or implications of inconclusive text. Most legislation is written in standing 
committees whose members remain affiliated from one Congress to the 
next and develop a level of expertise over subject areas within their 
ongoing jurisdictional ambit. Through formal hearings and executive 
sessions, and informal discussions and negotiations, committee members 
and committee staffs devote substantial time and energy to considering the 
problems the proposed law is supposed to address and how best to address 
them. Committee reports tend to reflect this level of consideration, 
offering both an overview of the policy need or “general purpose” behind 
the legislation and also an analysis of how various sections or provisions 
would implement the statute’s “specific intent” in different factual and 
legal settings.191  
In addition to being well informed, committee reports are also regarded 
as highly accessible due to a format that is orderly and understandable to 
other members, to the courts, and to the broader legal community. Reports 
typically set forth a policy or problem that has given rise to the need for 
new legislation and then describe the solution proposed by the new law, 
highlighting features that respond to particular issues or concerns. They 
 
 
 191. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 311 (2d ed. 2006); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 
479 (4th ed. 2005). 
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also frequently include additional or minority views, enabling committee 
members who oppose all or part of the proposed solution to present their 
competing concerns in some depth.192 
Senators and congresspersons have extolled the educative virtues of 
committee reports, both as members of the majority party and as the 
opposition. These legislators have analogized the report to the road map or 
“bone structure” of a statute, praising the report’s “central explanatory 
function” and its role in helping to address ambiguities in the text.193 Even 
members of the minority have often looked to committee report 
explanations to understand what they were voting on,194 to help focus 
generally worded statutory text, or to prevent “slippage” from agreements 
reached among key legislators.195 
Although committee reports as aids to statutory interpretation have 
certain limits,196 their status as the best informed and most accessible 
category of legislative history has led federal courts to turn to them first 
and foremost for guidance. Thus it is not surprising that of the forty-two 
Supreme Court decisions between 1996 and 2005 in tax law and labor and 
employment law that actually relied on legislative history, the legislative 
history deemed persuasive included committee reports some three-fourths 
of the time.197 
Committee reporting does not play the same role at all in the British 
legislative process. Standing committees in the House of Commons 
examine bills on a clause-by-clause basis, but this examination occurs 
 
 
 192. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 101-263, at 1 (1990) (presenting table of contents for Senate committee 
report accompanying the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990); POPKIN, supra note 191, at 
479 (describing standard, readily identifiable features of committee reports). 
 193. Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 184 (1986); see also 
Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 184, at 2 (statement of Representative Kastenmeier) (asserting, on behalf 
of “most” members, that committee reports can “explain and amplify” legislative language in ways 
that are instructive to the courts). 
 194. Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 184, at 21 (statement of Judge James L. Buckley). 
 195. See generally id. at 65 (statement of Representative Moorhead); Orrin Hatch, Legislative 
History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 43, 46–48 (1988).  
 196. Sometimes a report is irrelevant, as when a key provision has been added on the floor 
following committee deliberations. Other times the report is as ambiguous or incomplete as the 
statutory text. 
 197. See Table One, supra text accompanying note 157 (reporting Supreme Court reliance in 
thirty-three labor and employment decisions and in nine tax decisions). The Court’s majority opinion 
relied on committee reports to help explain or justify the holding in twenty-five of thirty-three labor 
and employment cases that relied on legislative history and in six of nine tax cases. By contrast, the 
Court relied on hearings or floor debates in roughly one-third of these decisions: fourteen of thirty-
three labor and employment cases, and one of nine tax cases. See also Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. 
Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 
JURIMETRICS J. 294, 304 tbl.II (1982) (reporting that for an earlier period, one-half of all Supreme 
Court references to legislative history were to committee reports). 
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after full House debate on the bill as a whole on second reading.198 
Importantly, committee review of bill sections or clauses takes place only 
once the bill has received approval in principle from the House, whereas in 
Congress committee review and approval are presumptive preconditions to 
endorsement by the full chamber. In addition, British standing committees 
are identified simply by a letter designation (e.g., A to H); they are not 
assigned particular subject matter jurisdictions, and members are selected 
to serve for each new bill.199 Accordingly, British committees lack the 
collective continuity and substantive competence that characterize 
standing committees in Congress.200 
Consistent with the differences between committees in terms of their 
cohesiveness, subject matter expertise, and basic function, the work 
products of parliamentary standing committees bear little resemblance to 
House and Senate committee reports. A British standing committee does 
not issue a detailed report that sets forth the bill’s purpose, summarizes the 
legal implications of various provisions, or recounts policy disagreements 
between bill supporters and opponents. Instead, the committee work 
product is typically a transcript of the meetings at which a clause-by-
clause review occurred, reporting particular amendments that were moved, 
accepted, or withdrawn.201 This recounting of bill modifications, along 
with question-and-answer exchanges between individual committee 
members and the government’s designated representative, can sometimes 
shed light on the meaning of a word or phrase in text, in much the same 
way as can the similar record of amendments and exchanges that occurred 
in the House as a whole.202 But the record of committee proceedings does 
not offer a coherent explanation for the bill or an analysis of its key 
 
 
 198. See ZANDER, supra note 7, at 53–54. 
 199. See id. at 54 & n.6; H.C. Info. Office, Factsheet L1: Parliamentary Stages of a Government 
Bill, 2007, at 4, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/L01.pdf.  
 200. See generally H.C. Info. Office, Factsheet L6: General Committees, 2006, at 3–5, 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/l06.pdf. The 1969 report of the Law Commissions 
recognized that congressional committee reports provide a richer deliberative perspective than is 
available under Britain’s committee report proceedings. See THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES, 
supra note 29, at 34, 38. 
 201. See Factsheet L6, supra note 200, at 5–7. See as examples House of Commons Standing 
Committee A 2005–06, Animal Welfare Bill Report of Proceedings, in 441 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th 
Ser.) (2006) 291; House of Commons Standing Committee A 2005–06, National Lottery Bill Report of 
Proceedings, in 438 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) (2005) 235. These reports are available at U.K. House 
of Commons, Public Bill Committees, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/stand.htm (last 
visited May 15, 2007).  
 202. Indeed, Pepper itself involved cites to exchanges between the Financial Secretary and 
standing committee members that were reproduced in Hansard. See supra text accompanying notes 
70–72. 
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provisions and their policy implications. Nor is this committee document 
made available to other legislators and their staffs prior to the initial 
decision to approve, modify, or reject the bill as written. 
As noted earlier, one member of the Law Lords who harbors grave 
reservations about judicial use of Hansard has urged that each bill be 
accompanied by detailed explanatory memoranda patterned on 
congressional committee reports, and he intimated that courts could 
properly rely on such legislative materials.203 Since 1999, most public bills 
have been accompanied upon introduction by brief explanatory notes 
drafted by the government department responsible for the legislation.204 
Unlike congressional committee reports, explanatory notes are neither 
prepared nor promoted from within the legislature. Largely for this reason, 
the leading judicial critic of Hansard regards the new explanatory notes in 
the same way he assesses other ministerial statements.205 Meanwhile, in 
light of the considerable differences in standing committee work products, 
a primary source of reliable legislative history in the American context is 
simply missing from the British setting. 
2. Compromise and Change During the Legislative Process 
The committee report distinctions just described are part of a larger 
difference between Britain and the United States in terms of how statutes 
are produced. In Britain, the lawmaking process is basically linear and 
efficient. The government exercises control throughout, and participation 
by legislators on the floor or in standing committee generally has little 
substantive impact.206 The government conceives of and introduces 
virtually all public bills.207 The opposing party accepts a considerable 
amount of government legislation at second reading.208 There may then be 
 
 
 203. See supra text accompanying note 104 (discussing recommendation by Lord Millett). 
 204. See Westminster County Council v. Nat’l Asylum Support Serv. [2002] UKHL 38, [2002] 4 
All E.R. 654, 656–57 (Steyn, L.J.) (describing new practice). 
 205. See id. (discussing explanatory notes as useful for identifying the mischief at which the law is 
aimed and in exceptional cases for estoppel against the executive, but never as reflecting the will of 
Parliament with regard to the meaning or scope of statutory language). 
 206. See, e.g., RICHARD CROSSMAN, THE DIARIES OF A CABINET MINISTER: VOLUME ONE 628–
29 (1975); Douglas Hurd, The Present Usefulness of the House of Commons, 3 J. LEGIS. STUD. 1, 2–3 
(1997). 
 207. See generally MARTIN PARTINGTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 40 
(3d ed. 2006); SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 20, at 58–60. 
 208. See ZANDER, supra note 7, at 81 (reporting bipartisan support for half of the government’s 
bills and vote by division on second reading in only twenty percent of government bills during the 
1970–74 period); see also CATHERINE ELLIOTT & FRANCES QUINN, ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 35–36 
(7th ed. 2006) (discussing how the whip system virtually ensures that a government with a reasonable 
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amendments offered seeking to clarify or refine particular bill clauses or 
sections, but Parliament is extremely unlikely to approve them if they are 
offered by opposition members or even by government backbenchers.209 
Because the government enjoys majority support in Parliament for its 
legislative program and traditionally imposes tight party discipline, there 
is rarely a need for it to negotiate or modify its original position. In the 
House of Commons, the government as bill manager is most concerned 
with pushing the bill through to enactment and is likely to resist merits-
based changes due to time constraints and related concerns about 
legislative derailment.210 Government-drafted amendments are accepted, 
but these usually result from subsequent thinking or planning by civil 
servants (perhaps stimulated by interest groups) rather than compromises 
or changes proposed by legislators.211 
The controlled and efficient process by which bills are introduced and 
enacted in Parliament has repercussions for the utility of legislative 
history. Bills that become public laws generally originate from within 
government departments or derive from recommendations made by 
independent commissions or advisory committees.212 The purpose behind 
these bills—the mischief at which they are aimed—is typically set forth in 
some depth through government consultative documents such as White 
Papers or through commission reports.213 The presence of such abundant 
pre-legislative materials means that a minister’s statement in committee or 
on the floor, explaining the bill’s purpose or the underlying mischief, is 
less likely to add substantial information or policy analysis that is new or 
otherwise unavailable. 
Parliamentary debate about proposed or accepted amendments does 
produce information that is apt to illuminate textual meaning in ways not 
expressed in other government documents. Major substantive amendments 
are not, however, a regular part of the parliamentary enterprise. The 
government, which is the only legislative player likely to have such major 
amendments accepted, has little incentive to offer them. Ministers steering 
 
 
majority will get its legislation through on second reading). 
 209. See ZANDER, supra note 7, at 82 (reporting an eleven percent success rate for backbencher 
amendments and a five percent rate for opposition members; ninety-five percent of amendments 
moved successfully in the House of Commons were so moved by ministers).  
 210. See Hurd, supra note 206, at 2. 
 211. See ZANDER, supra note 7, at 82. See generally PARTINGTON, supra note 207, at 45. 
 212. See DJ GIFFORD & JOHN R. SALTER, UNDERSTANDING THE ENGLISH SYSTEM 17–18 (1997); 
ZANDER, supra note 7, at 2–3. A smaller number of public laws stem from the ruling party’s election 
manifesto commitments or are in response to unexpected events in the public arena. See GIFFORD & 
SALTER, supra, at 18; ZANDER, supra, at 2.  
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 20–21 and 54. 
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a bill through Parliament seldom view themselves as having to 
compromise or make significant textual modifications in order to prevail. 
Accordingly, the record of parliamentary debates and proceedings contains 
relatively few instances in which legislative history can illuminate the 
meaning of substantially revised or newly forged statutory text. 
Parliamentary exchanges can shed light on the understandings or 
implications surrounding more minor textual adjustments.214 This indeed 
was the situation in Pepper, where the Finance Minister explained a 
government decision—made under pressure from backbenchers—to 
withdraw an amendment that would have taxed in-house benefits at higher 
rates.215 Moreover, even in an efficient legislative environment, the 
ambiguities inevitably associated with complex statutory language (often 
drafted under time pressures) allow for legislative history to play some 
clarifying role.216 Still, the dearth of large-scale bargaining or compromise 
as part of the legislative process diminishes the explanatory value of 
parliamentary narrative accompanying that process. 
In the United States, by contrast, due to formal divisions in power 
between the executive and legislative branches, as well as relatively lax 
party discipline and various procedural obstacles within Congress, most 
major bills that become public laws undergo considerable change from 
introduction to final enactment. For a start, bill introduction in Congress is 
not part of an organized or systemic government program. The executive 
branch plays an important role in the development of many bills, but it is 
far from the exclusive initiating actor and may not even be the primary 
influence during periods when Congress and the presidency are controlled 
by different parties.217 
Both bill introduction and legislative agenda formulation in the United 
States are highly decentralized, shaped by committee chairs who function 
as independent policy entrepreneurs, by private interest groups that invest 
heavily in the re-election campaigns of individual members, and by state 
and local governments that exert special influence associated with their 
separate sovereign status.218 Party leadership in both chambers labors with 
 
 
 214. See, e.g., In re R. [2005] UKHL 33, [2005] 4 All E.R. 433, 437 (U.K.) (Hope, L.J.); Regina 
v. Preddy, [1996] 3 All E.R. 481, 487–88 (H.L. 1996) (U.K.) (Goff, L.J.). 
 215. See Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, 70 (H.L. 1992) (U.K.). 
 216. See id. at 64; ZANDER supra note 7, at 21–24; Hurd, supra note 206, at 1–2. 
 217. Between 1968 and 2006, at least one chamber of Congress was controlled by a party other 
than that of the President for more than two-thirds of the time—all years except 1977–80, 1993–94, 
several months in 2001, and 2003–06.  
 218. See generally JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 229, 353–
61 (16th ed. 1995); ALAN GRANT, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 45–52, 65–66, 302 (5th ed. 
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some success to classify and channel the cascade of bills that are 
introduced and emerge from committee. Nonetheless, decision making in 
the American legislative process is best viewed as dynamic and 
discontinuous rather than static or linear; a leading observer’s depiction of 
Congress as “organized anarchy”219 aptly captures this reality. 
The value attached to inefficiency in the congressional lawmaking 
model is further attributable to the range of procedural constraints that 
allow a determined minority to delay or obstruct legislation. Some of these 
constraints are constitutionally explicit, although many are not.220 When 
combined with the tumultuous nature of agenda-setting and the finite 
amount of time available, procedural obstacles effectively invite the 
formation of majority coalitions that can negotiate compromises in text at 
various stages of the process. Many bills—especially if complex or 
controversial—are substantially modified or recast from their original 
form to accommodate the priorities of wavering colleagues or to co-opt 
segments of the opposition. Alterations often take place in one or both 
chambers through the committee process or on the floor during full debate; 
they also occur in conference when substantive differences must be 
reconciled. 
The baseline inefficiencies of Congress’s lawmaking process generate 
an added dimension to the value of legislative history in the U.S. setting. 
Because substantial adjustment and compromise in text following a bill’s 
introduction is the rule rather than the exception, committee or floor 
commentaries that accompany the particular stages of language 
modification are capable of shedding light on whatever qualitative changes 
have taken place. Legislative deals and bargains are a well-recognized 
feature of American lawmaking, and in the face of text that is ambiguous 
or incomplete, legislative history may illuminate the existence of a 
compromise or help to explain certain subtle aspects of the bargain. 
Several examples from relatively recent Supreme Court case law indicate 
the Court’s appreciation for how legislative history plays these roles. 
In a 1985 decision addressing whether the fiduciary to an employee 
benefit plan could be held liable for extra-contractual damages under 
 
 
1994). 
 219. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 84–86 (2d ed. 1995). 
 220. Examples of procedural constraints not specified in the Constitution include committee 
referral and markup, floor debate and amendment, control of the Rules Committee by the House, 
filibusters in the Senate, and reconciliation between two versions of a bill through conference. See 
generally Standing Rules of the Senate (2007); Rules of the House of Representatives (2007). For an 
example of constraints specified in the Constitution, see U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (describing 
bicameralism, presentment, and supermajority needed to override a presidential veto). 
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ERISA,221 the Court relied in part on legislative history to hold that 
Congress had not intended to authorize any remedies other than through 
the plan itself.222 Justice Stevens, for the majority, emphasized that the 
broad statutory relief described in the Senate committee report differed 
from the bill version passed by the House, and that the compromise 
reached in conference followed the House approach.223 
A similar instance of invoking legislative history to help establish the 
existence of a compromise occurred in a 1985 decision reviewing whether 
the Environmental Protection Agency was prohibited from issuing certain 
pollutant discharge waivers under the Clean Water Act.224 Justice White, 
for the majority, noted that an early version of the bill had proposed 
banning the waivers and that the version of the text negotiated by the 
House and the Senate was inconclusive. The majority then relied on the 
House manager’s explanation of the negotiated conference version to his 
colleagues on the House floor in determining that Congress had not meant 
to include the waivers as part of the final statutory deal.225 
The Court also uses legislative history to help discern subtle 
dimensions of a legislative bargain. A 1994 decision construing Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act relied on legislative history to establish that 
supporters and opponents had in effect agreed to disagree on whether the 
highly contentious 1991 amendments to Title VII should be applied 
retroactively.226 Based on an elaborate review of earlier bill versions and 
Senate floor debates—indicating that no deal had been reached on the 
controversial retroactivity issue—Justice Stevens, for the Court, went on 
to hold in favor of the traditional presumption against retroactivity, noting 
the absence of congressional intent to overcome that presumption.227 
 
 
 221. ERISA is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1001–1461 (2000). 
 222. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145–46 (1985). 
 223. Id. For another ERISA example, see Laborers Health Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight 
Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 547–49 (1988) (relying on floor debate to help establish that Congress did 
not legislate as protectively as employees contended). 
 224. See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985). 
 225. See id. at 126–27. For another Clean Water Act example, see Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 315–20 (1982) (relying on committee report to help clarify that Congress 
established a permit system as middle ground solution given “‘the impracticality of any effort to halt 
all pollution immediately’”). 
 226. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 227. See id. at 250–63. For another example under federal anti-discrimination law, see Pub. 
Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 178–80 (1989) (relying on legislative history of 1967 Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act to construe an employer exemption that reflected a compromise 
among competing congressional goals). 
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The examples reviewed here are not meant to suggest that legislative 
history commentary is essential to identifying the existence or contours of 
compromises reached during lawmaking. Negotiated final arrangements 
are at times discernible from textual analysis,228 and in any event not all 
legislative history accurately captures the essence or fine points of these 
arrangements. What matters for comparative purposes is that substantial 
textual change is a regular feature of the congressional lawmaking process 
in a way that differs fundamentally from the British parliamentary 
experience, and that this difference has consequences for the utility of 
legislative history. 
To be sure, compromise on basic policy choices and implementation 
strategies does occur in Britain, but differences typically are resolved 
before bill language is made public—through debate within a law reform 
commission, the upper levels of a government ministry, or the Prime 
Minister’s inner circle.229 Given the emphasis on pre-legislative 
negotiation, it is entirely rational for British courts to refer regularly to 
commission reports and White Papers, as noted in Part II.A above. By 
contrast, our system relies far more heavily on compromise following bill 
introduction. Divisions of power between Congress and the President, and 
between the House and Senate, encourage negotiations at various stages of 
a bill’s progression, and legislative history associated with these different 
stages may well capture important dimensions of any deals that are struck. 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court recognizes and 
relies on such history to help understand post-introduction legislative 
bargains, something that the Law Lords are far less likely to have to 
consider given the dynamics of the parliamentary process. 
3. Singular Versus Diverse Sources of Legislative History 
The dominant role played by the executive branch in the British 
lawmaking process has additional implications with respect to judicial use 
of legislative history. Prior to Pepper, some opponents of legislative 
history voiced the concern that, if interpretive resources were to include 
parliamentary statements by ministers, courts would in effect be 
redistributing power from the legislative branch to the executive by 
allowing ministerial commentary to influence the meaning of enacted 
 
 
 228. See generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 71, 76–79 (2006).  
 229. See supra text accompanying notes 212–13. 
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text.230 The court in Pepper did not explicitly address this particular 
separation of powers concern.231 The decision to admit ministerial 
statements, however, effectively implies that the Law Lords found any 
risks of executive branch interference with parliamentary sovereignty to be 
outweighed by the benefits of having access to potentially enlightening 
explanatory materials. Deferring for the moment whether the executive 
branch is likely to exploit this new resource,232 it is worth noting that the 
test set forth in Pepper restricts judicial access to legislative history by 
making ministerial participation virtually an essential component of what 
is admissible. 
With respect to the different uses of legislative history sanctioned by 
Pepper and subsequent decisions, ministerial presentations are necessary 
when seeking a clearer understanding of the government’s own policy that 
is being subjected to judicial review.233 Ministerial statements are 
obviously important in other judicial review contexts as well, such as in 
identifying the mischief at which the statute is aimed and shedding light 
on the meaning of particular words or phrases in text. It is conceivable, 
however, that exchanges among backbenchers or opposition members 
could also offer probative evidence in these latter settings even without 
participation by a government representative. 
The Law Lords have on rare occasions referred to non-ministerial 
exchanges during parliamentary debate as aids to construing the meaning 
of text.234 Still, the expectation in light of Pepper is that ministerial 
statements are centrally important,235 and the Law Lords invoke such 
statements in almost all instances, usually with little or no reference to 
contextual remarks by ordinary legislators.236 This limitation on the 
sources of validly admissible legislative history means that only a subset 
 
 
 230. See Bankowski & MacCormick, supra note 177, at 381; see also Styles, supra note 4, at 
155–57 (raising same concern in immediate aftermath of Pepper). 
 231. Lord Browne-Wilkinson addressed a different separation of powers concern, namely that 
admitting parliamentary commentary in court would impinge on the interpretive powers of the 
judiciary. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
 232. See infra Part II.C.4. 
 233. See supra notes 36–37, 124 and accompanying text (discussing opinions in Brind and 
Wilson).  
 234. See, e.g., Regina v. Preddy, [1996] 3 All E.R. 481, 487–88 (H.L. 1996) (U.K.) (Goff, L.J.) 
(relying on statements from two members of the House of Lords); Stubbings v. Webb, [1993] 1 All 
E.R. 322, 329 (H.L. 1992) (U.K.) (Griffiths, L.J.) (relying on statements from proposer of bill, a 
backbencher). 
 235. See Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, 64, 67 (H.L. 1992) (U.K.). 
 236. See, e.g., Anderson v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2002] UKHL 46, [2002] 4 All E.R. 
1089, 1093–96 (U.K.); Regina v. Ministry of Def. ex parte Walker, [2000] 2 All E.R. 917, 920–21 
(H.L. 2000) (U.K.). 
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of parliamentary debates and proceedings is available for judicial 
reference. 
By contrast, the universe of legislative history sources to which courts 
have access in the U.S. setting is considerably broader. The executive 
branch regularly contributes to the creation of legislative history as part of 
its role in the lawmaking process. Contributions occur primarily through 
testimony at committee hearings but also through memoranda or 
statements placed in the Congressional Record as attachments to floor 
remarks by a leading bill advocate or opponent.237 As previously 
discussed, however, the executive branch is often not the most influential 
actor in legislative proceedings; multiple members of Congress typically 
play important roles in the various stages of moving a bill to final 
enactment. 
There are innumerable occasions on which legislative history sources 
unrelated to executive branch participation may be deemed to help clarify 
the meaning of enacted text. For instance, when a congressional committee 
has eliminated bill language that would have supported one party’s claims, 
the Supreme Court, when interpreting the statute, may well invoke this 
change based on its presumption that Congress does not intend to enact 
language it has earlier deleted.238 Similarly, when bill sponsors and 
supporters describe a provision’s principal aim during floor debate, such 
evidence of purpose may lead the Court to conclude that a permissible 
reading of text is also the correct reading.239 
Even if a bill changes very little from introduction to passage, there are 
distinct decisional moments when legislative history can help narrate or 
explain what has occurred. Committee reports, floor colloquies reflecting 
shared understandings, floor statements from managers on both sides of 
the aisle, and conference reports all can shed light on the meaning of text. 
Given this range of sources, the Supreme Court simply has more types of 
legislative history material on which to consider relying than does its 
British counterpart. 
 
 
 237. See, e.g., Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 134–35 (1983) (analyzing 
executive branch testimony at House committee hearing); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 
244, 262 & n.15 (1994) (discussing “interpretive memorandum” prepared with executive branch input 
and introduced on floor by bill sponsors). 
 238. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 93 (2001). 
 239. See West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 218–20 (1999). 
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4. Opportunism in the Creation of Legislative History 
A final structural issue is the possibility that legislative history will be 
generated for opportunistic reasons, especially by key participants. Courts 
are prepared to rely on legislative history as an aid to construing text, and 
pivotal actors in the legislative process are aware of this reliance. The risk 
therefore arises that legislative history will include explanations or 
assertions about the text refashioning or deviating from the presumptively 
shared understanding of what that text means.240 To the extent that courts 
have good reason to worry about such abuses, their willingness to rely on 
legislative history may be chilled. Accordingly, it is worth considering the 
likelihood that creators of legislative history in the British and American 
settings will engage in such manipulation. 
In Britain, the concern is over manipulation by the executive branch. 
The executive is ultimately in charge of drafting virtually all statutory text, 
and it is also the central player in creating relevant legislative history. The 
bright-line test set forth in Pepper can be viewed as allowing if not 
inviting strategic behavior, by conferring probative value on clear 
ministerial statements so long as a court decides that the text itself is 
sufficiently ambiguous. Thus, a minister worried about the politics of a 
vote on some controversial issue could avoid a tough public choice by 
fudging the relevant text and packing the parliamentary record to slant the 
ambiguous provision in terms the government would prefer.241 
Alternatively, ministers can infuse the record with statements purporting 
to spell out the meaning of statutory sections, anticipating that courts will 
tend to defer to such statements instead of launching more rigorous 
examinations of the underlying text.242 
There is no indication in the Law Lords’ opinions applying Pepper that 
the Court has found ministers engaging in such strategic behavior. 
 
 
 240. Concern over opportunism in the creation of legislative history is distinct from the concern 
that honestly produced legislative history will at times be unreliable. Even responsible and well-
prepared participants (such as congressional committee chairs or parliamentary ministers) are not 
always able to deliver precise statements or complete responses in the harried atmosphere of 
legislative debate. Committee chairs are more likely to offer comprehensive and well-considered 
explanations in committee reports than in the pressured setting of an exchange on the floor. Similarly, 
a minister who is thoroughly briefed by her staff is less likely to miscommunicate the meaning of a 
textual provision than one who responds to questions from members without consulting with her 
department. Courts in both countries must assess the reliability of legislative history based on a range 
of factors, just as they do when confronted with arguments from counsel about the reliability of 
particular dictionary definitions or canons of construction. 
 241. See generally Miers, supra note 86, at 706. 
 242. See generally Styles, supra note 4, at 156–57. 
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Although the conduct may be occurring without judicial awareness, 
ministers will be constrained to some degree by the civil servants and 
parliamentary counsel who prepare advice for them regarding the meaning 
of statutory provisions, and also by the interest groups and media 
representatives that pay attention to parliamentary proceedings on 
important or controversial bills. If a minister in her explanation to 
Parliament departs from or distorts the professional advice she has 
received, presumptively neutral officials or attentive lobbyists might leak 
such conduct to interested legislators as well as the media.243 It is, 
however, difficult at this point to gauge whether the prospect of informal 
oversight—especially with respect to civil servants in the minister’s own 
department—is having a substantial deterrent effect. 
In the United States, the main concern about manipulation of 
legislative history stems from the plethora of record materials that actors 
within Congress produce.244 Executive branch personnel, interested parties 
outside of government, and members and their legislative staffs may all be 
players on a particular bill, and all of them have a stake in leaving their 
mark on the statutory product. Lengthy committee reports, as well as floor 
colloquies or statements by bill managers that may be inserted unspoken 
into the Congressional Record, provide ample opportunities for strategic 
behavior.245 
 
 
 243. See generally Miers, supra note 86, at 706–07. 
 244. In contrast to Britain’s parliamentary structure, the U.S. executive branch has no privileged 
role in generating legislative history as part of the congressional enactment process, although it often 
does make important contributions. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. Beginning in the 
Reagan era, presidential signing statements—delivered after bicameral approval and presentment—
have been used with some frequency as part of an effort to influence the way a statute is interpreted by 
the courts. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 14, at 10. Recently, President Bush has used 
signing statements more extensively to declare that he will not enforce portions of the text that he is 
signing into law, based on his interpretation of what the enacted language means or his desire to avoid 
a perceived constitutional problem. This qualitative change in the use of signing statements has been 
met with criticism by members of Congress from both parties and by leaders in the legal profession. 
See, e.g., S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 14; ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 14. The 
legal and policy implications of post-enactment presidential signing statements are beyond the scope 
of this article. For further information, see generally Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in 
the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1245–50 (2006); Note, Context-Sensitive Deference 
to Presidential Signing Statements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 597 (2006). 
 245. For an example of strategic insertion in a lengthy committee report, see Brudney, supra note 
179, at 94–97 (criticizing as unreliable a House committee report discussion that disapproved of a 
Supreme Court decision construing federal pension provision; discussion occurred in a single 
paragraph of the 1500-page House committee report on Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act). For an 
example of a strategic floor statement by a leading bill sponsor, see Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. 
Forest Service, 655 F.2d 951, 956 n.8 (9th Cir. 1981) (criticizing as unreliable an analysis of a 
disputed bill section that was offered by the author of that section on Senate floor eight days after 
Congress had passed the bill), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). 
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There are constraints, however, on legislative actors behaving in such a 
manner—notably, certain incentives within the legislative process that 
operate to encourage accuracy and probity, especially by committee 
leaders (who tend to function as bill managers) and their staffs.246 In the 
short-term, members know they must rely on colleagues’ representations 
at the committee stage as to what a bill means, because Congress operates 
heavily through its committees and members depend upon the accuracy of 
committee-based information in moving the legislative agenda. More 
generally, members as repeat players in the legislative process typically 
aspire in the long-term to a positive relationship with their colleagues and 
with the institution. The desire to be viewed as honest and fair even during 
fierce partisan disputes thus creates an impetus for committee leaders and 
floor managers not to overstate or understate a bill’s general or specific 
objectives.247 
The content and format of committee reports are also visible enough to 
help offset the risk of manipulation. Minority views in a report can point 
out a failure to present adequately or accurately the position of the 
majority, or highlight areas of disagreement among committee members. 
Such views provide notice to other legislators, their staffs, and the 
leadership about the need to consider controversial matters when the bill 
reaches the floor.248 
In the end, it is difficult to compare the frequency with which British 
and American legislative actors opportunistically create legislative history. 
Risks of abuse arise from different factors, related to distinct aspects of the 
respective legislative processes. The main protection against such abuse is 
whistle-blowing and its related reputational consequences. Both 
lawmaking systems provide actors with ample reasons to sound an alarm 
against legislative commentary that overstates or undermines the agreed-
upon meaning of text. These reasons are more likely to stem from political 
or partisan factors in the United States, and from professional or civil 
service considerations in Britain. Nonetheless, the whistle-blowing 
 
 
 246. This and the following paragraph in text rely on positions previously presented by the author. 
See Brudney, supra note 179, at 54, 59. 
 247. Moreover, congressional staff are not likely to act strategically without their boss’s approval 
given their status as agents who are typically more dedicated to their principals than are agents 
elsewhere in the labor market. Staff are recruited to work for committees based in part on loyalty to the 
chair or hiring members. Members are also sensitive to conduct that might threaten their own job 
security, and staff performance is often effectively monitored by the media as well as the hiring 
member. Finally, unlike many government personnel, congressional-committee and personal-office 
staff are at-will employees. See generally Brudney, supra note 179, at 50. 
 248. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing how the presence of minority or 
additional views is readily apparent from the table of contents).  
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constraints that operate in each lawmaking system would seem to render 
the incidence of abuse anecdotal rather than systemic. 
Underlying these constraints is a belief that the primary audience for 
legislative history is other members and not judges. Commentary in 
standing committees or on the floor can be attributed to Parliament or 
Congress as a whole because (or insofar as) the prominence, amplified 
reasoning, and persuasive context of the commentary suggests what a 
reasonable legislator would have had in mind when voting on the text. By 
relying on the principle of reasonably imputed institutional approval, both 
the Supreme Court and the Law Lords have implicitly endorsed that 
belief.249 
Still, even if it is impracticable to determine whether Britain’s or 
America’s legislative history setting is more susceptible to manipulation, 
the three factors examined previously in this part help explain why 
legislative history usage is higher in the Supreme Court than in the Law 
Lords.250 Standing committees in the American setting generate more 
cohesive and substantively competent indications of statutory meaning 
than their British counterparts. Further, because legislative bargaining and 
compromise are more frequent in the American context, the accompanying 
commentary is more likely to include reliable insights as to how the 
legislative process has shaped the intent underlying enacted text. Finally, 
the breadth of legislative history sources available in connection with 
congressional lawmaking offers courts more materials from which to glean 
what the legislature meant when enacting certain inconclusive words or 
phrases. 
III. PREDICTIVE AND NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS 
Notwithstanding that the Law Lords use legislative history less 
frequently than the Supreme Court, the Lords of Appeal have now had 
fifteen years of exposure to parliamentary materials since Pepper. The 
initial ebb and flow of their participation, described in Part I, featured 
expressions of judicial frustration as well as enthusiasm, but certain 
 
 
 249. See supra text accompanying notes 171–78. 
 250. My focus has been on factors directly related to the availability and reliability of legislative 
history. More extrinsic factors also may play a role—for instance, the relative propensity of American 
and British courts to prefer canons of construction to legislative history when seeking to resolve 
textual ambiguity or confirm textual meaning. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court uses the 
canons in this regard, see Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 150, at 29–36, 77–
95. Consideration of the Law Lords’ use of canons, and comparative analysis on this point, are 
deferred to a future article. 
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signals have begun to emerge. Recapping key recent developments, Part 
III.A predicts that the Law Lords are likely to build on the foundation of 
Pepper and may well expand upon their current patterns of use. Assuming 
that there will be no British retreat to the pre-1992 position, Part III.B 
offers preliminary normative thoughts based on comparisons of how the 
two high Courts currently debate and apply this interpretive resource. It 
proposes that the Supreme Court might wish to move beyond what has 
become a somewhat stilted debate between legislative history advocates 
and opponents by borrowing from the British approach. It also suggests 
that the Law Lords’ early efforts to categorize different kinds of 
parliamentary exchanges in rule-oriented terms should yield to the more 
flexible ad hoc approach followed by Supreme Court Justices who make 
use of legislative history. 
A. The Next Stage of Post-Pepper Development 
Quantitative data presented earlier suggests that the Law Lords are in 
the process of consolidating if not augmenting a permanent role for 
legislative history as an interpretive asset. The proportion of Law Lords 
decisions in which at least one judge discusses Hansard materials was 
more than twice as high in 2001−2005 as in 1996−2000.251 In addition, the 
proportion of decisions referencing White Papers or commission reports 
increased substantially in the 2001−2005 period.252 These legislative 
materials were deemed admissible in court long before Pepper. Still, it 
seems plausible to regard the Law Lords’ increased propensity to refer to 
them as part of a growing appreciation for how the intentions underlying 
enacted text can be identified and applied based on historical evidence as 
well as linguistic analysis. 
Perhaps more revealing than aggregate trends are two recent decisions 
in which the Law Lords stretched their initial rule by setting forth further 
grounds for relying on Hansard. Although Pepper’s three-part test credited 
only explanatory statements made by a minister or other prominent bill 
supporter,253 Lord Bingham’s leading speech in the 2005 case of Jackson 
 
 
 251. See Table One, supra text accompanying note 157. This latest five-year average, comprising 
roughly one-seventh of the Court’s decision docket, includes many non-controversial uses of 
Hansard—addressing agency policy that is under judicial review or the background mischief at which 
a statute is aimed. But there are also a substantial number of judicial opinions using parliamentary 
materials for the more controversial primary objective established in Pepper—to help determine the 
meaning of text that is ambiguous or obscure. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.  
 253. See Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, 69 (H.L. 1992) (U.K.) (discussed supra notes 64–
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v. Attorney General relied on the Hansard-recorded history of approved 
and defeated amendments to illuminate the meaning of text.254 Lord 
Bingham and his colleagues understood that he was not consulting 
Hansard materials strictly as authorized under Pepper, because in their 
view the text was sufficiently clear without such consultation.255 Lord 
Bingham’s reliance on drafting history during the legislative process—
reviewed and analyzed through reference to Hansard—represents a 
notable, even if unacknowledged, extension of the court’s earlier 
approach. 
Similarly expansive is the Court’s more self-conscious valuing of 
Hansard for confirmatory purposes in the 2006 case of Harding v. 
Wealands.256 Although Pepper permitted the use of ministerial statements 
only if statutory text was ambiguous or obscure, Lord Hoffmann and Lord 
Rodger each relied on a parliamentary statement by the Lord Chancellor—
offered to defuse a possible amendment—in order to strengthen their 
reading of language they regarded in any event as neither ambiguous nor 
obscure.257 Lord Carswell, implicitly recognizing this enlargement of 
Pepper’s conceptual domain, declared that ministerial statements may be 
most valuable in practice to confirm that the text means what it seems to 
say.258 
The conclusion that the Court may invoke Hansard for such supportive 
or reinforcing purposes is noteworthy because it brings the legitimization 
of legislative history use more in line with decades of somewhat covert 
judicial practice—from Lord Denning’s 1979 confession that he often 
peeked at Hansard (presumably to see if he had missed anything)259 to 
recent extrajudicial statements that the Law Lords look to Hansard 
(presumably for reassurance) far more often than they actually cite to the 
 
 
66 and accompanying text). 
 254. See Jackson v. Att’y Gen. [2005] UKHL 56, [2005] 4 All E.R. 1253, 1263–64, 1268 (U.K.). 
 255. See id. at 1271 (Bingham, L.J.), 1276–77 (Nicholls, L.J.), 1285 (Steyn, L.J.). The Hansard-
related reasoning in these three opinions is discussed supra notes 133–40 and accompanying text. Lord 
Nicholls announced his view that ministerial statements were valuable to confirm the apparent 
meaning of text, setting forth a position subsequently endorsed by Lords Hoffmann, Rodger, and 
Carswell. See infra text accompanying notes 257–59. 
 256. See Harding v. Wealands [2006] UKHL 32, [2006] 4 All E.R. 1 (U.K.). 
 257. See id. at 12–13 (Hoffmann, L.J.), 23 (Rodger, L.J.). 
 258. See id. at 25–26 (Carswell, L.J.). The Hansard-related reasoning in the three Harding 
opinions is discussed supra notes 142–45 and accompanying text. The Law Lords had ignored the first 
of the three Pepper factors (that the text must be ambiguous or obscure) in a number of early 
decisions, see supra note 86 and accompanying text, but they had not previously embraced in such 
open and deliberative terms the legitimacy of using Hansard for confirmatory purposes.  
 259. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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parliamentary record.260 This use of legislative history to confirm plain 
meaning also brings British justifications more in line with our own.261 
Ironically, legislative history reliance for confirmatory purposes may be 
on the decline in the Supreme Court, as Justices otherwise comfortable 
with such uses decide, even if subconsciously, not to risk losing the 
allegiance of Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas by invoking the resource 
when it performs a supportive rather than essential function.262 
The quantitative and doctrinal evidence highlighted here does not mean 
that the Law Lords will now proceed to expand steadily their use of 
Hansard. The fifteen year period since the Pepper decision contrasts with 
U.S. experience of 115 years since the Supreme Court’s decision in Holy 
Trinity Church,263 the case that in retrospect is viewed as ushering in our 
modern legislative history era.264 It was not until several decades after the 
Holy Trinity Church decision that judicial reliance on legislative history 
became a relatively consistent practice.265 British judges and academics 
continue to express some second thoughts about the Pepper rule and its 
consequences, and the Law Lords may well endure a period of uneven 
development with respect to Hansard references for the near future. 
Nonetheless, the Law Lords since 1992 have come to rely on 
legislative history for a range of theoretical reasons that are familiar to 
American judges and legal academics. As evidenced in Pepper, 
 
 
 260. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s observation 
in Pepper that many distinguished judges acknowledged they already were looking at Hansard to 
discern the intention of Parliament). 
 261. See, e.g., Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 184, at 5–6, 14–15 (statement of Chief Judge Patricia 
Wald) (reviewing the Court’s decisions from the 1989 term that use legislative history to confirm 
apparent textual meaning); Stephanie Wald, The Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation 
Cases in the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court Term: Scalia Rails but Legislative History Remains on Track, 
23 SW. U. L. REV. 47, 50–53 (1993) (analyzing five decisions from the 1992 term that used legislative 
history to support or confirm a conclusion reached after determining that the text was not ambiguous). 
 262. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 8, at 222–24 (reporting and discussing their finding that 
three Justices who served for substantial periods before and after Justice Scalia’s arrival in 1986 relied 
on legislative history significantly less often in their majority opinions written since 1986); Thomas W. 
Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 365 (1994) 
(attributing majority decline in legislative history use to realities of building majority coalitions among 
Justices in the face of an uncompromising stance by Justices Scalia and Thomas). 
 263. Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
 264. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 680–81 (3d ed. 2002). For two comprehensive and thoughtful yet 
conflicting analyses of Holy Trinity Church, compare Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of 
Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (2000) 
(supporting the Court’s decision), with Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of 
Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998) 
(doubting the wisdom of the Court’s approach). 
 265. See generally Eskridge, supra note 17, at 392; Frankfurter, supra note 1, at 542–43. 
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parliamentary debates are on occasion important in traditional rule-of-law 
terms to help resolve the meaning of ambiguous text. As demonstrated in 
Jackson and Harding, both drafting history and ministerial exchanges may 
be valuable from an intentionalist standpoint to reinforce or confirm that 
the apparent meaning of certain statutory words or phases is also the 
meaning that members of Parliament most probably had in mind. Finally, 
as indicated in a series of decisions,266 the parliamentary record is relevant 
in a purposivist context for describing certain background policy rationales 
that help inform the interpretive enterprise. In short, the Law Lords appear 
to be broadening their insights as to how referring to Hansard sheds light 
on the existence of legislative intent and also helps clarify the context in 
which Parliament chose to enact certain language as statutory text.267 
B. Possible Lessons from Comparative Experience 
It seems likely that legislative history references will remain a feature 
of statutory interpretation in British courts even as reservations continue to 
be expressed. With that prospect in mind, I offer some preliminary 
thoughts on what the Supreme Court and Law Lords might learn from one 
another in terms of how each currently approaches the use of legislative 
history. 
1. Judicial Debate Between Advocates and Skeptics—A Lesson for the 
Supreme Court? 
When the Law Lords in Pepper abandoned prior precedent and 
authorized consideration of parliamentary proceedings, they made clear 
that their new interpretive approach would require judges to assess just 
how helpful Hansard might be on a case-by-case basis. Although the 
legislative history at issue in Pepper was deemed highly persuasive by the 
majority,268 Lord Browne-Wilkinson repeatedly observed that as a general 
proposition, parliamentary materials contain simply an indication of the 
mischief at which a statute was aimed or the cure that Parliament intended 
to effect through the use of certain words.269 The opinions in Pepper 
regarded Hansard as one among many aids to the construction of 
 
 
 266. See, e.g., cases identified supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 267. Cf. Chomsky, supra note 264, at 951–52 (suggesting reasons why American judges should 
consult legislative history based on lessons from Holy Trinity Church). 
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 45–48 and 70–73 (recounting how the majority shifted 
from pro-government to pro-taxpayer outcome largely due to legislative history). 
 269. See Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, 64, 67 (H.L. 1992) (U.K.). 
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ambiguous text—one that can assist the court to varying degrees 
depending on the factual circumstances.270 In subsequent decisions, the 
strongest advocates for invoking legislative history have reiterated that 
even when Pepper’s three-part test for admissibility was satisfied, a court 
still must assign weight to the ministerial statements in light of all relevant 
considerations.271 
Legislative history skeptics on the highest Court have effectively 
adopted the same basic approach in a post-Pepper world. Admissibility of 
Hansard as a judicial aid is settled, and the primary issues that trigger 
debate are whether courts should accord weight to parliamentary 
proceedings in varying contexts. Thus for Lord Steyn—the leading 
judicial critic of Pepper—Hansard is potentially valuable to courts in 
order to estop the executive from abandoning its prior representations in 
Parliament as to the meaning of particular words or phrases in text.272 Just 
how valuable Hansard is for this purpose will vary depending on the 
circumstances in which an estoppel argument arises.273 
Similarly, Lord Steyn and other legislative history skeptics recognize 
that Hansard may be of assistance in identifying the mischief at which a 
textual provision is aimed, and that such a role will at times shed light on 
the meaning of the text under review.274 Judges with reservations about 
certain uses of legislative history also are prepared—in suitable 
 
 
 270. See id. at 69 (Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.), 51 (Griffiths, L.J.), 52 (Oliver of Aylmerton, L.J.). 
Professor Vogenauer persuasively argues that the opinions in Pepper accord probative but scarcely 
binding weight to Hansard, preserving for the courts the ultimate constitutional authority to determine 
the meaning of statutory text. See Vogenauer, supra note 4, at 661–63. 
 271. Lord Nicholls in his Ex parte Spath Holme opinion observed that to say parliamentary 
materials qualify as an external aid means simply that such materials “are a factor the court will take 
into account” along with other interpretive resources that may assist in construing ambiguous or 
obscure text. Regina v. Sec’y of State for Env’t, Transp. & Regions ex parte Spath Holme Ltd. [2001] 
1 All E.R. 195, 218 (H.L. 2000) (U.K.) (emphasis added); id. at 223 (Cooke, L.J.) (stating that courts 
“can in the end derive real help from Hansard, even if it is not necessarily decisive help” (emphasis 
added)); see also Harding v. Wealands [2006] UKHL 32, [2006] 4 All E.R. 1, 25 (U.K.) (Carswell, 
L.J.) (opining that references to Hansard as a “confirmatory aid” will be helpful on some occasions but 
not on others). 
 272. See McDonnell v. Congregation of Christian Bros. Trs. [2003] UKHL 63, [2004] 1 All E.R. 
641, 655–56 (U.K.); Steyn, supra note 5, at 67, 70. 
 273. Compare, e.g., Ex parte Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All E.R. at 227 (Hope, L.J.) (contending that 
estoppel rationale was properly invoked in Pepper), with Regina v. A. [2001] UKHL 25, [2001] 3 All 
E.R. 1, 28 (U.K.) (Hope, L.J.) (concluding that estoppel rationale carries no persuasive weight under 
the facts of the case). 
 274. See, e.g., Lesotho Highlands Dev. Auth. v. Impreglio SpA [2005] UKHL 43, [2005] 3 All 
E.R. 789, 798–99 (U.K.) (Steyn, L.J.); Regina v. Soneji [2005] UKHL 49, [2005] 4 All E.R. 321, 324–
25 (U.K.) (Steyn, L.J.); Regina v. A., [2001] 3 All E.R. at 47–48 (Hutton, L.J.). 
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circumstances—to rely on the record of a statute’s drafting history to aid 
in understanding statutory language.275 
The debate within the Law Lords between legislative history advocates 
and skeptics thus goes to weight more than admissibility. Some judges 
contend that courts should never use Hansard to help identify 
parliamentary intent as to the meaning of enacted words or phrases, but 
even those judges agree that Hansard can be valuable in a range of other 
interpretive settings. Disagreements since Pepper suggest that the Law 
Lords are searching for an appropriate balance in terms of how often to 
use legislative history, not whether it should be relied on at all. These 
disagreements, informed by concern over the possible costs that would be 
imposed on parties and their counsel who comb through Hansard and on 
lower court judges who must evaluate the results of such searches, have 
produced a lively and at times nuanced set of exchanges. 
By contrast, recent debate on the Supreme Court between legislative 
history advocates and skeptics has generally been cast in an all-or-nothing 
form. Justice Scalia has shaped the terms of this debate, insisting that 
judges ought never consult, much less rely on, legislative history when 
construing statutes.276 In support of his position, Justice Scalia has 
advanced constitutional and practical arguments for why courts should 
eschew all reference to legislative history.277 He has been joined in this 
blanket-rule approach on some occasions by Justice Thomas, but after 
twenty years by no one else on the Court.278 Several Justices have 
responded to the Scalia critique, defending or justifying the basic utility of 
legislative history, albeit with relatively spare arguments.279 Early returns 
 
 
 275. See Jackson v. Att’y Gen. [2005] UKHL 56, [2005] 4 All E.R. 1253, 1263–64 (U.K.) 
(Bingham, L.J.). 
 276. See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1990–91 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518–28 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); SCALIA, supra note 159, at 
31–37.  
 277. For constitutional arguments, see, for example, Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 
597, 621 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (invoking separation of powers considerations); Immigration 
& Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452–53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(invoking legislative supremacy considerations). For practical arguments, see, for example, Conroy, 
507 U.S. at 519 (invoking litigation costs to parties); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (invoking likelihood of opportunistic behavior in creation of legislative 
history). 
 278. See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., 
concurring); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 172 n.1 (1993) (reflecting the views of Scalia and 
Thomas, JJ.). Justice Scalia is supported by certain members of the academic community who share 
his belief that legislative history should never be consulted. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 161; Nagle, 
supra note 161; Vermeule, supra note 161. 
 279. For examples of abbreviated defenses, see, for example, Conroy, 507 U.S. at 518 n.12 
(Stevens, J.); United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 516 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J.); 
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from the Roberts Court suggest there will be no new converts to the Scalia 
position; indeed, Justice Alito, in one of his first majority opinions, drew a 
sharp rebuke for invoking legislative history to help confirm the Court’s 
construction of language in a criminal statute.280 
Justice Scalia’s deeply skeptical views were manifested most recently 
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.281 An important issue in that case was whether the 
2005 Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) deprived the federal courts of 
jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition (pending at the time of DTA 
enactment) that was brought by an alien who had been detained by the 
Department of Defense at an American prison in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba.282 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, concluded that both the DTA 
text and its legislative history reflected Congress’s determination not to 
remove habeas jurisdiction for cases pending at the time of enactment.283 
In his reliance on the legislative record, Justice Stevens invoked the Act’s 
drafting history, noting that Congress had rejected earlier proposed 
versions of the statute that would have removed the jurisdiction at issue.284 
Justice Stevens also pointed to the floor statement of a leading Senate 
cosponsor, delivered during debate preceding the Senate vote, while 
discounting contrary statements by two other Senate cosponsors because 
they had been inserted into the Congressional Record after the Senate 
debate and vote had taken place.285 
Justice Scalia, in dissent, took aim at both prongs of the majority’s 
legislative history position. He insisted that the timing of floor statements 
by Senate sponsors was entirely irrelevant because such statements by 
individual members lacked any probative significance.286 Similarly, 
 
 
Mortier, 501 U.S. at 611–12 n.4 (1991) (White, J.). For a more detailed justification, see Bank One 
Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276–78 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 280. See Zedner, 126 S. Ct. at 1985–86 (Alito, J.) (relying on Senate and House committee 
reports); id. at 1990–91 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority’s reliance on legislative history 
as predicated on a “naïve belief” in the imputation of collective intent from a committee report 
statement, and as especially “ill-advised” in this case); see also Confirmation Hearing on the 
Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States, Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 318–19 (2005) (statement by then-nominee Roberts that he had 
“quoted and looked to legislative history in the past [as an appellate judge] to help determine the 
meaning of ambiguous terms, and [that he] would expect to follow the same approach on the Supreme 
Court”). 
 281. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2815–17 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 282. See id. at 2759, 2762–69 (majority opinion). 
 283. See id. at 2765–69 (setting forth majority conclusions based on text and legislative history). 
 284. See id. at 2766. 
 285. See id. at 2766, 2767 n.10. 
 286. Id. at 2815–16.  
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Justice Scalia reaffirmed his view that there was no reason ever to rely on 
the drafting history accompanying a bill’s enactment.287 
Supreme Court Justices who are prepared to rely on legislative history 
in at least some circumstances regularly attach weight to distinctions such 
as those between pre-enactment and post-enactment statements, or 
between live floor debate and inserted remarks; they also regularly regard 
drafting history as probative under certain conditions. Even British judges 
who have voiced serious reservations about legislative history have 
accorded weight in some circumstances both to live parliamentary 
exchanges and to drafting history.288 Both British and American judges do 
so because they subscribe implicitly if not expressly to the principle of 
reasonably imputed institutional approval—that the value to be accorded 
to legislative history in a given case is linked to whether congressional or 
parliamentary materials can persuasively be deemed to have been noticed, 
understood, and endorsed by a presumptively reasonable legislator.289 This 
is not the place to address the relative merits of conceptual and practical 
disagreements between Justice Scalia and his colleagues regarding the 
status of legislative history. What matters for present purposes is that 
because of Justice Scalia’s committed opposition to any form of legislative 
history usage, conceptual disagreements among the Justices are almost 
inevitably cast in terms of admissibility rather than weight.290  
 
 
 287. See id. at 2817. 
 288. See, e.g., Ghaidan v. Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 3 All E.R. 426–27 (U.K.) (Steyn, 
L.J.) (crediting live parliamentary exchange); Jackson v. Att’y Gen. [2005] UKHL 56, [2005] 4 All 
E.R. 1253, 1263–64, 1268 (U.K.) (Bingham, L.J.) (crediting drafting history). 
 289. See supra text accompanying notes 173–76 (discussing this principle as evidenced in 
writings of Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter). See generally Brudney, supra note 179, at 75–80. 
 290. Justice Scalia does on occasion engage legislative history advocates on their own terms, 
arguing that the legislative history evidence is contextually unpersuasive even indulging the 
assumption that it is admissible. See, e.g., Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2816 (arguing that the majority 
exaggerates the one-sidedness of pre-enactment floor debate); Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687, 
726–30 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority overvalues committee report evidence 
while undervaluing certain floor statement evidence). Moreover, Justice Scalia has carved out at least 
one exception to his blanket rule: courts may consult legislative history in the rare instances when 
doing so would enable them to avoid an absurd result apparently dictated by the text. See Green v. 
Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). Nonetheless, Justice 
Scalia has expressed his fundamental objections to any use of legislative history with conviction and 
perseverance, and his position has become the singular focus for debate and interchange among the 
Justices as to the methodological value of this resource.  
Justice Scalia’s skepticism regarding legislative history is an integral part of his larger jurisprudential 
campaign to restrict judicial choice or discretion in the interpretation of statutes. See generally SCALIA, 
supra note 159; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); 
see also Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory 
Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 370–71 (2005). The view that use of legislative history promotes 
judicial discretion and that textualism confines such discretion is seriously contested, but is beyond the 
scope of this article. 
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A less noticed side effect of this conceptual debate has been the 
relatively impoverished nature of the Supreme Court’s dialogue on how to 
approach legislative history as an interpretive asset. While members of the 
Law Lords grapple with different ways in which Hansard might or might 
not assist in illuminating the meaning of enacted text, members of the 
Supreme Court have focused on the threshold issue of admissibility. One 
could imagine a more enlightening set of judicial exchanges addressed to 
the relative utility of legislative history in diverse settings. There would be 
ample scope for such exchanges, given that the sources of legislative 
history generated by Congress are at once richer and potentially more 
perplexing than what is produced within Parliament. 
For instance, should legislative history be regarded as presumptively 
more valuable to help resolve textual ambiguities that stem from lack of 
foresight rather than lack of political consensus? Is legislative history 
accompanying omnibus bills generally less suitable for judicial use 
because congressional deals on such a grand scale are simply 
indecipherable? Should legislative history in certain subject areas be 
presumed to have less weight where the law is administered primarily by a 
federal agency rather than private parties, or where the statutory text tends 
to be detailed and technical rather than open-ended and more public 
interest oriented? There are no ready answers to such questions, and legal 
scholars are contributing to the conversation.291 But in light of the current 
Court’s fault line, focused on the threshold admissibility of legislative 
history, the Justices have played little role in exploring how or whether 
legislative history should be valued differently in varying circumstances—
an exploration that is thriving among the Law Lords. 
2. Applying Legislative History—A Lesson for the Law Lords? 
It is still early in Britain’s post-Pepper period, but the Law Lords have 
created a series of putative bright-line classifications to decide how and 
when courts can invoke legislative history as an interpretive asset. There is 
some question as to whether these distinctions among multiple categories 
can withstand prolonged scrutiny; for now, the Court’s approach seems in 
 
 
 291. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Attention to Context in Statutory Interpretation: Applying the 
Lessons of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation to Omnibus Legislation, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, 
Nov. 2002, at 6–15, available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art1; Michael Livingston, Practical 
Reason, “Purposivism,” and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 (1996); Merrill, 
supra note 262; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Book Review: No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
2041, 2074–75 (2006). 
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part an effort to impose order in a new and unfamiliar area of 
responsibility. 
As described more generally in Part I.C above, the Law Lords have 
recognized two categories of Hansard usage as unproblematic and as 
having the potential for general application. First, a court may consult 
Hansard to identify the mischief at which a law is aimed and then use the 
identified mischief-avoidance purpose to assist in construing the statutory 
text. Thus, for instance, the Law Lords invoked a ministerial discussion of 
the philosophy behind the 1996 Arbitration Act when deciding that an 
arbitrator’s error of law, standing alone, could not be challenged in Court 
as “the tribunal exceed[ing] its powers” under the statute.292 
The second broadly applicable, unproblematic category draws on 
legislative history materials to assist the courts in understanding the 
contours of the government’s policy when reviewing agency decisions for 
basic fairness or rationality. In this context, the Law Lords have relied on 
ministerial explanations in Parliament to help understand government 
sentencing procedures that allegedly abridged the right to a fair tribunal293 
and government policies for compensating miscarriages of justice when 
those policies were alleged to be inadequate.294 
Apart from these two categories, described as “innocuous” in a leading 
2003 decision,295 some Law Lords have identified a third assertedly 
noncontroversial use of Hansard, premised on a rationale of estoppel 
against the government. This category is meant to prohibit the government 
from abandoning in court a clear representation previously made in 
Parliament with respect to the meaning of certain statutory words or 
phrases, or with regard to a government commitment not to exercise its 
power in a given situation.296 The estoppel rationale for limiting Hansard 
 
 
 292. See Lesotho Highlands Dev. Auth. v. Impreglio SpA [2005] UKHL 43, [2005] 3 All E.R. 
789, 798–801 (U.K.) (Steyn, L.J.); see also Regina v. Soneji [2005] UKHL 49, [2005] 4 All E.R. 321, 
324–25 (U.K.) (Steyn, L.J.) (relying on parliamentary statements that accompanied the 1995 Proceeds 
of Crime Act, identifying a need to prevent confiscation orders from being quashed “‘merely because 
some procedural error has taken place,’” in its decision to reverse an appellate court’s quashing of a 
confiscation order simply on timeliness grounds). 
 293. See Anderson v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept. [2002] UKHL 46, [2002] 4 All E.R. 
1089, 1093, 1095 (U.K.) (Bingham, L.J.), 1104–05 (Steyn, L.J.).  
 294. See Mullen v. Sec’y of State for Home Dept. [2004] UKHL 18, [2004] 3 All E.R. 65, 72 
(U.K.) (Bingham, L.J.), 79–82 (Steyn, L.J.). 
 295. Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd. [2003] UKHL 40, [2003] 4 All E.R. 97, 117 (U.K.) 
(Nicholls, L.J.). 
 296. See id. at 130–31 (Lord Hope) (discussing estoppel rationale with respect to meaning of 
certain words); Regina v. Sec’y of State for Env’t Transp. & Regions ex parte Spath Holme Ltd., 
[2001] 1 All E.R. 195, 212 (H.L. 2000) (U.K.) (Lord Bingham) (discussing estoppel rationale with 
respect to scope of government powers). 
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use has recently been questioned on conceptual grounds,297 but in any 
event this category can be expected to have a very narrow application.298  
In addition to certain agreed-upon roles for legislative history, the Law 
Lords have identified several distinct areas as contentious. A fourth 
category of Hansard usage that has become controversial is the one at the 
core of the Pepper decision. Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s determination—
that courts may and at times should rely on statements during 
parliamentary debates as an aid to the construction of enacted words or 
phrases—continues to be endorsed by many members of the Law Lords 
but has been renounced by some others.299 The Law Lords also have 
declared Hansard references off limits in a fifth and sixth setting regarded 
as suspect. In Ex parte Spath Holme, the court announced that (subject to 
the improbable government estoppel exception) ministerial statements 
addressed to the scope of a government’s statutory powers were 
inadmissible in court.300 In Wilson, the Law Lords further concluded that 
in reviewing domestic legislation challenged as incompatible with 
European Convention law under the 1998 Human Rights Act, courts could 
not consult Hansard to aid in resolving issues of compatibility.301 
The distinctions among these various categories may, at a minimum, 
require some adjustment as new controversies arise. For example, the Ex 
parte Spath Holme decision involved a challenge to the government’s 
exercise of its statutory authority to “‘provide for . . . restricting or 
preventing increases of rent.’”302 Assuming arguendo that a minister’s 
parliamentary statement clearly set forth the justification behind the 
creation of this power to “restrict[] or prevent[] increases,” it is not 
obvious why such legislative history should be excluded as bearing on the 
scope of government power, rather than taken seriously as relating to the 
 
 
 297. See Sales, supra note 147, at 589–90 (contending that insofar as a statute is enacted to bind 
citizens as well as the government, it makes little sense to conclude—under an estoppel rationale—that 
the text should have one meaning when applied to the government and another meaning when applied 
to private citizens). 
 298. The Law Lords have described the prospect of a minister assuring Parliament that certain 
discretionary powers would never be used as “improbable[]” and “most unlikely.” Ex parte Spath 
Holme, [2001] 1 All E.R. at 212. The Court’s discussion of estoppel in the meaning-of-words context 
has focused almost exclusively on whether this rationale confines the scope of the holding in Pepper 
itself. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Congregation of Christian Bros. Trs. [2003] UKHL 63, [2004] 1 All 
E.R. 641, 655–56 (U.K.) (Steyn, L.J.); Wilson, [2003] 4 All E.R. at 130–31 (Hope, L.J.).  
 299. See supra text accompanying notes 129–47. 
 300. See Ex parte Spath Holme, discussed supra text accompanying notes 117–18. 
 301. See Wilson, discussed supra text accompanying notes 121–25. 
 302. Ex parte Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All E.R. at 200 (quoting Landlord and Tenant Act, 1985, 
C.70, § 31(1) (Eng. & Wales)). 
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meaning of an enacted phrase.303 Similarly, when considering the 
proportionality of a statutory provision under the Human Rights Act, it is 
puzzling that the Court may find Hansard materials inadmissible to help 
determine matters of compatibility, yet useful because related to the 
background mischief at which the provision is aimed.304 
Whether the particular lines drawn by the Law Lords when applying 
legislative history are sustainable in practical and conceptual terms is 
beyond the scope of this Article.305 For present purposes, what stands out 
is that the judges on Britain’s highest court have created as many as six 
presumptively strict categories in the course of determining that judicial 
reliance on Hansard may in different settings be innocuously helpful, 
controversial yet beneficial, or troubling and unwelcome. As for why the 
Court has adopted this somewhat rigid approach, it may be that such line 
drawing is regarded by the judges, even if subconsciously, as the best way 
of giving shape to a dramatic new set of responsibilities. 
Rules are often favored as legal directives because they are perceived 
as providing a level of certainty or predictability.306 The Law Lords may 
well regard their efforts at classification as furnishing important guidance 
to lower courts that have entered an interpretive domain deemed off limits 
for centuries. Such guidance may be especially apt because early evidence 
indicates fairly substantial Hansard usage by lower courts.307 Further, such 
a rule-based approach may be part of a judicial effort to channel, if not 
confine, attorney appetites for this new asset.308 Attorneys’ interest in 
parliamentary materials creates additional burdens for judges, because the 
required submission of Hansard extracts accompanied by a written 
summary of argument imposes an extra obligation on courts that rely 
heavily on oral presentations and that lack law clerks to aid in the review 
 
 
 303. Compare id. at 212 (Bingham, L.J.) (regarding Hansard as inadmissible), with id. at 215, 
218–19 (Nicholls, L.J.) (regarding Hansard as admissible but not persuasive in this instance), and id. at 
219–23 (Cooke, L.J.) (regarding Hansard as admissible and helpful in this instance). 
 304. See Williamson v. Sec’y of State for Educ. & Employment [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 All 
E.R. 1, 10, 16–17 (U.K.) (Nicholls, L.J.) (recognizing that proportionality of provision prohibiting 
parent-supported corporal punishment by teachers at a religious school “is to be judged objectively and 
not by the quality of the reasons advanced . . . in the course of parliamentary debate,” while also noting 
with approval that the debate featured consideration of whether to override parental choice and 
specifically discussed the Convention rights of parents).  
 305. See generally Bennion, supra note 106; Sales, supra note 147; Vogenauer, supra note 4. 
 306. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 22, 62 (1992). 
 307. See sources cited supra note 146. 
 308. In this regard, see also supra text accompanying notes 67–69 (setting forth procedural 
hurdles to use of Hansard by counsel, including sanctions for noncompliance). 
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and analysis of such pre-hearing submissions.309 Finally, the Law Lords 
themselves seem somewhat wary of what they have wrought,310 and a 
series of ostensibly sharp lines may lend structure to what is for them a 
rather open-ended enterprise. 
In contrast to the Law Lords’ sudden exposure to Hansard, the 
Supreme Court has been invoking committee reports, floor statements, and 
drafting history to assist in construing statutes on a fairly regular basis for 
more than half a century.311 Over this period, the Court has not articulated 
bright-line rules or even a terribly structured approach for legislative 
history usage. Instead, the Justices have applied a rather amorphous 
standard based on reliability—an approach that tends to take account of 
the totality of circumstances in a given case. 
To be sure, there is a broadly recognized hierarchy of reliable 
legislative history sources. Conference reports, standing committee 
reports, and explanatory floor statements by bill sponsors or managers are 
clustered near the top,312 while legislative inaction, statements by 
nonlegislative drafters, and post-enactment history are arrayed close to the 
bottom.313 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court often finds committee report 
evidence to be unhelpful or legislative inaction to be highly probative 
based on the factors at hand, and the Justices do not appear especially 
dedicated to assigning any given source a predictable place within the 
hierarchy.314 In addition, legislative history sources of all kinds are often 
regarded as more valuable or useful to help address the meaning of 
 
 
 309. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing special pre-hearing submission 
requirements for use of Hansard). See generally HOUSE OF LORDS, PRACTICE DIRECTIONS AND 
STANDING ORDERS APPLICABLE TO CIVIL APPEALS (2007), at 21–25, 30, available at 
www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199697/ldinfo/ld08judg/bluebook/blue.pdf 
(describing components of the skeletal argument to be submitted by counsel in advance of hearing, and 
noting that oral arguments may last more than 17.5 hours (four sitting days)). 
 310. See, e.g., Jackson v. Att’y Gen. [2005] UKHL 56, [2005] 4 All E.R. 1253, 1285 (U.K.) 
(Steyn, L.J.); Robinson v. Sec’y of State [2002] UKHL 32, [2002] N. Ir. L.R. 390, 405 (U.K.) 
(Hoffmann, L.J.). 
 311. See sources cited supra note 17. 
 312. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 191, at 311–12; KENT GREENAWALT, 
LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 173 (1999). 
 313. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 191, at 315–17; GREENAWALT, supra note 
312, at 174–75. 
 314. For example, on the issue of whether courts should rely on the silence of legislative history as 
evidence that a statutory amendment effecting a potentially substantial change in policy has not done 
so, compare Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592 (1980) (stating that “[i]n ascertaining the 
meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog 
that did not bark” (emphasis added)), with Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 & n.23 (1991) 
(relying on the legislative history’s silence as probative that Congress lacked an intent to make a major 
policy change, likening “Congress’s silence in this regard . . . to the dog that did not bark”). See 
generally Siegel, supra note 290, at 385–89. 
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inconclusive text than they are to confirm, question, or supplant the 
meaning of text that is clear.315 Yet the Court continues to consult 
legislative history even when the text itself is unambiguous,316 and it 
justifies this practice in the face of other decisions that seem bent on 
prohibiting it.317 
The Supreme Court’s approach when applying legislative history is 
open to criticism for being overly vague, and the concept of reliability is 
not easy to pin down. Professors Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett have 
referred generally to whether a given committee report or floor manager’s 
statement constitutes “reliable evidence of consensus within the legislature 
that can be routinely discerned by interpreters,”318 and I discussed earlier 
whether legislative record evidence “can persuasively be deemed to have 
been noticed, understood, and endorsed by a presumptively reasonable 
legislator.”319 Although each of these formulations leaves ample—some 
would say excessive—room for the exercise of judicial discretion, there 
are certain advantages to the use of such an interpretive approach. 
One benefit is that the reliability standard is flexible enough for judges 
to adapt its application as relevant factors change over time.320 For 
example, because of advances in technology such as electronic voting and 
live telecasts of floor proceedings, members spend considerably less time 
than they used to on the floor of the House or Senate, either debating and 
listening to one another or discussing privately how they expect to vote.321 
It seems reasonable to infer from this change that floor statements, even 
those delivered by bill managers, should less readily be deemed to have 
been noticed and endorsed by presumptively reasonable legislators when 
those legislators’ presence on the floor has become principally associated 
 
 
 315. See generally Breyer, supra note 184, at 848. 
 316. See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1985–86 (2006); Gen. Dynamics Land 
Sys. Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586–89 (2004). 
 317. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 
U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (citation omitted). See generally Siegel, supra note 290, at 386. 
 318. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 191, at 304 (emphasis on “reliable” 
omitted). 
 319. See supra text accompanying note 289. 
 320. See generally Sullivan, supra note 306, at 66. 
 321. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 151–53 (1994); A SECOND REPORT OF THE RENEWING 
CONGRESS PROJECT 57 (The American Enterprise Inst. & The Brookings Inst. 1993); George E. 
Connor & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Deliberation: An Untimed Value in a Timed Game, in CONGRESS 
RECONSIDERED 315, 324–25 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 5th ed. 1993). 
Members also come to the chamber floor less often due to other factors, such as the need to spend 
considerable time raising money for re-election campaigns. 
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with the ringing of a bell to announce a timed vote.322 There is some 
evidence that in the aggregate, the Court’s reliance on floor statements as a 
proportion of its overall legislative history reliance has declined 
substantially since the late 1980s.323 This decline warrants further 
investigation, but it seems plausible that the Justices (and the litigants who 
appear before them) may be adjusting their sense of what constitutes 
reliable legislative history in response to changing realities of the 
lawmaking process. 
Another possible advantage of a less rule-oriented focus is that it forces 
judges to acknowledge that they are exercising discretion when invoking 
some legislative history sources and not others, or relying on that history 
for some reasons and not others. In this regard, the Supreme Court’s ad 
hoc approach to applying legislative history may reflect the increased 
sense of assurance that accompanies a more mature or settled stage of 
jurisprudence on this topic. The Court has been making use of legislative 
history for several generations, and the current Justices have been exposed 
in their education, if not in their experience, to various complexities of the 
lawmaking process.324 It is therefore not surprising that those who make 
regular use of legislative history seem comfortable separating wheat from 
chaff on an individual-case basis in much the same way they do when 
applying other interpretive resources.325 
 
 
 322. See GREENAWALT, supra note 312, at 175–76 (contending that because fewer members are 
present or paying attention to floor debates today, reliance on those floor debates to reflect collective 
legislative intent is less persuasive). 
 323. Preliminary findings are derived from the dataset of 650 Supreme Court decisions on 
workplace law compiled by the author. See supra note 150. Brudney and Ditslear have looked at the 
Court’s reliance on different legislative history sources, measured in five-year intervals starting with 
1969–73 and ending with 1999–2003. They found that reliance on House floor statements dropped 
from more than forty percent of all majority opinions using legislative history during the early- and 
mid-1980s to well below twenty percent of such cases after 1988. Reliance on Senate floor statements 
as a percentage of all cases relying on legislative history declined from more than fifty percent in the 
1980s to roughly fifteen percent in the period since 1993. A copy of these preliminary results is on file 
with the author. 
 324. To be sure, fewer Justices today have first-hand legislative experience than was the case in 
the decades preceding 1970. See James J. Brudney, Foreseeing Greatness? Measurable Performance 
Criteria and the Selection of Supreme Court Justices, 32 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1015, 1049 (2005). Still, 
all have been exposed to the legislative process in college and/or law school, most have had years of 
experience sifting the products of that process as appellate judges, and presumably many if not all 
follow congressional developments and disagreements as intelligent consumers of the Washington 
media. 
 325. A proponent of legislative history in the United States might well respond that Britain’s rule-
based approach would do a better job of limiting the discretion available to Supreme Court Justices, 
and that limiting judicial choice in this area is especially desirable given the volume and diversity of 
legislative history sources typically available in the American context. Whether the Court’s reliability 
standard would be enhanced if the Justices were to endorse and adhere to one or more subsidiary 
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Over time, British judges—educated and experienced in common-law 
traditions and practice—may come to adapt their initial approach to the 
dynamic realities of European as well as domestic events. The recent 
opinions in Jackson and Harding suggest an evolving awareness of how 
Pepper, read literally, may unduly confine the Court’s ability to make 
constructive use of Hansard. Given these developments, it seems possible 
and perhaps desirable that the Law Lords consider a more flexible and less 
rule-bound approach when determining how best to make use of 
parliamentary materials. 
CONCLUSION 
Fifteen years after Pepper v. Hart, the Law Lords remain in the initial 
stages of a fruitful debate concerning the appropriate uses of legislative 
history. This Article suggests that the British Court’s applications and 
refinements of Pepper, when viewed from a comparative perspective, can 
contribute to a deeper understanding of certain interpretive challenges 
facing our own federal judiciary. 
Both the Law Lords and the Supreme Court rely on legislative record 
evidence to help clarify the meaning of statutory text. Some of the judicial 
rhetoric in Britain reflects concern that Pandora’s box has been opened, 
while discussion regarding recent Supreme Court practice has focused on 
the trend toward limiting judicial usage. Notwithstanding these 
perceptions, the comparative reality is that over the past decade, the 
Supreme Court’s use of legislative history well exceeds Law Lords 
references to Hansard. The Article’s analysis of certain factors in each 
country’s legislative process helps account for why this substantial 
difference exists and is likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future. 
At the same time, the Article’s examination of aggregate data and 
doctrinal developments since 1992 suggests that the Law Lords will 
continue to rely on parliamentary materials and may well extend the 
permissible scope of Hansard references. From a comparative standpoint, 
it is intriguing that British legal culture, which shares the basic American 
approach to judicial review of statutory meaning, now finds enhanced 
interpretive value in the historical materials that help fuel the legislative 
process. By endorsing the legitimacy and utility of Hansard, the Law 
Lords may in effect be exerting subtle normative pressure on those who 
would reject legislative history altogether in the U.S. setting. In contrast to 
 
 
guidelines presumptively constraining the uses of legislative history warrants further consideration in 
another setting. 
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Britain, our legislative record features an especially informative 
resource—committee reports—and explanatory materials that regularly 
shed light on the bargains endemic to our lawmaking enterprise. Those 
distinctive assets would seem to argue for our becoming more attentive to 
the nuances of positive reliance on legislative history, rather than simply 
continuing to debate the merits of its wholesale exclusion. 
Finally, the comparative explanations and analyses presented here 
should be viewed as a first step in the development of an ongoing research 
agenda. It is important to examine, for instance, how British lower courts 
have used Hansard under the rule of Pepper, and how they are responding 
to the Law Lords’ recent signals in Jackson and Harding. In addition, 
British courts have long made use of traditional textualist resources such 
as dictionaries and language canons when interpreting statutes.326 It would 
be worth exploring how the admissibility of parliamentary materials is 
affecting previously settled judicial practices in this regard. As legislative 
history becomes a more established element in Britain’s approach to 
statutory interpretation, there will doubtless be other ways to pursue how 
courts in that country consider what is below the surface and yet fairly 
understood to be part of enacted text. 
 
 
 326. See, e.g., Mandla v. Dowell Lee, [1983] 1 All E.R. 1062, 1065–66 (H.L. 1983) (U.K.) 
(invoking several dictionary definitions of contested statutory phrases); Queens Univ. of Belfast v. 
Comm’r, [2001] R. & V.R. 112, 112–13 (Lands Trib. for N. Ir. (2000)) (invoking language canon of 
ejusdem generis). 
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